The Implementation of Coercive Diplomacy in the International Nuclear Crisis with Iran, 2003-2004

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Introduction

This research thesis focuses on the manner in which coercive diplomacy was implemented during the international nuclear crisis with Iran between the years 2003-2004 by the key relevant players in the international arena at the time – the UK, France and Germany (the EU3) and the United States - and the lessons to be learned from this effort. The following analysis takes into account both the options at their disposal during this period, as well as each party's own motives.

The research question: How did the implementation of coercive diplomacy by the EU3, in the international nuclear crisis with Iran between 2003-2004, apply the principles of diplomatic "coercion"?

This study is based on the following suppositions:
Firstly, the lack of implementation of coercive diplomacy by the EU3, in accordance with the combination of tools proposed in theoretical literature, limited measures it took against Iran;

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Secondly, forgoing the threat of the use of force – embodied by the United States – reduced the chances for success of the EU3's initiative. This study of the implementation of coercive diplomacy in the international nuclear crisis with Iran stems from analysis made in the theoretical literature. Measures taken by the EU3 at critical junctions of the crisis will be examined in accordance with the parameters chosen, such as: preservation of a balanced combination of tools, from diplomatic to military; maintenance of credibility between the threat of "punishment" and its realization; European motivation to implement coercive measures in the face of Iran's determination to advance its nuclear program; the cost/benefit balance of compliance; and the influence of Iran's sense of external security threat on its decision whether to comply or not.

In examining the implementation of international diplomatic coercion surrounding the nuclear crisis with Iran, this research and analysis reflects a combination of three main components:

* The foundations of theoretical literature in the areas of "coercive diplomacy," "military coercion" and "nuclear reversal" – including differences in approach in this context between the European Union and the United States.

* Principles of thwarting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), with an emphasis on "nuclear reversal".

* Analysis of the central events in the international nuclear crisis with Iran between 2003-2004: efforts to advance an international diplomatic strategy designed to resolve the crisis, conduct of the main European players, the perspective of their American counterparts, and the Iranian view.
This study includes an examination of a range of evidence and empirical materials (in addition to theoretical literature): reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); resolutions by the IAEA's Board of Governors (BOG); decisions by the EU's foreign ministers within the framework of the General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC); public statements by representatives of the EU, US and Iran; parliamentary debates and US Congress hearings; think tank briefings by senior officials; briefings by White House and State Department spokespersons; as well as media interviews and memoirs by relevant figures.

To complement the research, personal interviews were conducted with a limited number of individuals from Europe, the US and Israel who were intimately involved in the crisis during the relevant period. Their comments are not quoted in the body of the work, but are certainly taken into account in understanding what transpired at the time.

The period in question was chosen after being identified as a critical junction between the initial phase of the crisis and the consolidation of a formal outline in the form of the "Paris Agreement." Events that took place in 2002 and 2005 are mentioned in accordance with their relevance to the main period under examination in the study.

In this context, the crisis began in August 2002, when an Iranian exile opposition group revealed information concerning Tehran's nuclear enrichment program (Jafarzadeh, 2002) – while at the same time the world's attention was focused on the Iraqi crisis. Despite the international community's repeated calls on Iran to cease its activities, in fact such concrete threats meant to deal with Tehran's non-compliance were carried out only in 2006.

The EU32 led the implementation of coercive diplomacy against Iran, envisioning the developing crisis as an opportunity to strengthen the EU's
political standing. In accordance with EU policy, the three Europeans countries made repeatedly clear their determination to solve the crisis through "diplomatic measures" – their intention being to remove the use of force option from the table, for all intents and purposes.

The EU3 decision to refrain from considering the use of force raises the question, examined in this work, of whether it is at all possible to implement "pure" coercive diplomacy in the face of a WMD challenge without the presence of a threat to consider the use of force. In responding to this question in the context of the Iranian nuclear crisis, this study seeks to judge events on the ground in the context of theory, along three main parameters: demands and their realization, motivation levels of the parties involved, and the cost/benefit of compliance (as opposed to non-compliance). The significance of foregoing the threat of force will also be examined.

This study closely examines an interesting and creative international effort to confront a non-conventional threat through diplomatic means. The case before us differs from other major proliferation-related events that took place during the same period and even beforehand, including: efforts in the '90s to deal with the Russian construction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power facility (now completed) were mostly conducted by the US, vis-à-vis Russia on the one hand and Israel on the other (Bolton, 2007); attempts during that same decade to confront North Korea were essentially conducted bilaterally between Washington-Pyongyang, with the support of minor players within the framework of the "Six Party Talks" (at least until adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2006); the Libyan case, exposed in 2003, was handled by the US and UK vis-à-vis Libya without any additional partners; and the Iraqi case evolved into a second Gulf war, with the incursion by American and British forces in March 2003 (and a search for WMD that came up empty).
It is essential to learn from the EU3’s efforts – successes, as well as failures – with a view to similar challenges that are likely to appear in the future in the context of preserving global peace and security in general, and in the non-proliferation area in particular.

The importance of this study is its precedent: to the best of this author’s knowledge, to date it remains the sole objective, multi-state examination of the link between diplomatic and military power in the Iranian nuclear crisis (the terms "diplomatic" and "political" are used interchangeably in this work). Its main contribution lies in the practical conclusions it lays out with a view to the future.
Theoretical Background

Political (Diplomatic) Power

Morgenthau (1948) refers to international politics as a power struggle, the goal of which is to attain control "over the minds and actions of other men" (as opposed to the direct use of physical violence). In his view, political power constitutes a "psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact which the former exert on the latter's minds." This is achieved through orders, threats, authority/charisma or a combination of these.

Morgenthau emphasizes that in any international affairs discussion dealing with economic, financial, territorial or military policy a distinction should be made between policy "undertaken for its own sake" and policy meant solely to control another state's policy. The author categorizes the various goals of policy and states' motives thus: a state whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power pursues a status quo policy; one whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power pursues a policy of imperialism; and a state which seeks to demonstrate the power it has pursues a policy of prestige. For the purposes of this study, a "policy of prestige" in the Iranian nuclear crisis can be attributed to the EU3.

Defining diplomacy as the most important component of national power in coordination with military capabilities, Morgenthau outlines its parameters: determining objectives in accordance with actual existing power in order to attain defined goals; assessing the goals of other states and their actual power in this context; and making use of appropriate means to reach the desired goals. In the author's opinion, a shortcoming in the realization of at
least one of these parameters is liable to endanger successful implementation
of the entire foreign policy. This is an essential gauge of the EU3's behavior:
the correct use of appropriate means would be critical to the success of their
effort.
In the end, says Morgenthau, “it is the final task of intelligent diplomacy,
intent upon preserving peace, to choose the appropriate means” - persuasion,
compromise or the threat of force – necessary to achieve its objectives and
implemented at the proper time. He emphasizes that “intelligent and
peaceful” diplomacy cannot rely solely on the threat of force, nor
exclusively on persuasion or compromise. At the same time, such diplomacy
also cannot ignore the implementation of any means – including the threat of
force – when circumstances require it. This insight is also pertinent to the
matter at hand.

“Compellence”

“Compellence” is the ability to impose something on somebody against his
will, with or without the use of physical force. Its goal is to achieve
“compliance,” and to change an existing situation or course of action chosen
by the object of compellence. The threat of compellence must be brought
into play to maintain credibility, and in this context requires the imposition
of “punishment” on the adversary until “compliance” is achieved. This is to
be differentiated from “deterrence,” which seeks to maintain the status quo,
and in which the “punishment” is imposed only when the adversary acts.
It is absolutely necessary that the initiated act (the "punishment") be
acceptable to the one imposing it and also be sustainable over time, so that
pressure influences the other side. A deadline for compliance with the
demands must also be set.
Schelling (1966) emphasizes that as opposed to deterrence, the time dimension is crucial to compellence: too short a time frame for execution makes compliance impossible, while too prolonged a time frame makes compliance irrelevant. Ability to stop or reverse compellence once the adversary complies is also important; otherwise, the rival will have no incentive to comply.

For the purposes of this study, the fact that the EU3 decided on certain steps does not necessarily indicate they had already internalized from the start the extent to which they would perhaps need to punish Iran, whether they would be able to rise to the challenge, and if not – what the consequences would be.

"Coercive Diplomacy"

When military force is employed for bargaining purposes, it constitutes a part of diplomacy called "coercive diplomacy." To this end, it is important that the adversary expect the use of force that is withheld as a result of compromise. The power to cause harm – latent violence - is part of one's bargaining ability, and leveraging it is diplomacy. The difference between force and diplomacy is the difference between taking what you want and convincing the other side to give you what you want. Coercive diplomacy, then, is based on latent violence (Schelling, 1966). Schelling extends and builds on Morgenthau (1948) with regard to the necessity of combining persuasion, compromise and the threat of force – especially concerning the reciprocal relationship between diplomacy and force – even though his point of departure is force, not diplomacy. George (1991) develops the notion of coercive diplomacy suggested by Schelling, and explains the principle of backing a demand vis-à-vis an
advocate with a threat of punishment for non-compliance – one that will appear sufficiently credible and tough so as to convince the rival to submit to the demand. The advantage of coercive diplomacy - as compared with force - is the relatively low price in psychological, economic and political terms. Threats and incentives play an important role in coercive diplomacy – as do the media, signaling, bargaining and negotiation.

George's definition of coercive diplomacy could serve as a suitable gauge for examining the implementation of diplomatic power during the period relevant to this study. He identifies these factors as pertinent (George, 1991): the demand, the means to create a sense of urgency, the punishment being threatened because of non-compliance, and the possible use of incentives. In addition, George (1991) notes five types of coercive diplomacy that stem from the differences among the above factors:

**Ultimatum**: involves the use of demands and threats while setting a deadline for compliance.

**Tacit Ultimatum**: when the threat or deadline are conveyed indirectly.

**Try and See**: includes a demand and begins with the use of fairly soft coercive force, which is beefed up in case of non-compliance.

**Gradual Turning of the Screw**: makes clear at the very start the intention to use force with increasing potency until compliance is attained.

**Carrot and Stick**: when the compelling side adds incentives to the threats.
The carrot and stick approach dominated the EU's conduct in the negotiations regarding Iran's enrichment efforts, as demonstrated in the following case study.

The chosen strategy's success partially depends on effective communication between the sides, as well as coordination between words and deeds. Furthermore, the success of coercive diplomacy often depends on a balance of the sides' motivation: which side is more committed to achieving its goals? In the end, the adversary's assessment of the threat's motivation, commitment, credibility and power will all play a significant role in the strategy's success (George, 1991). These constitute additional gauges to assist this research.

George is skeptical regarding the potential success of coercive diplomacy. After delineating several factors likely to promote (but not guarantee) its success – including clear and consistent demands, sufficient motivation, the ability to convey a sense of urgency to the adversary, and the adversary's fear of escalation – he concludes that while coercive diplomacy will exact a lower price than the use of force, rarely can its potential success be counted on.

It should be noted that the three authors reviewed thus far (Morgenthau, 1948; Schelling, 1966; and George, 1991) address a reality involving an action by a state vis-à-vis its rival, but not a multi-state reality – the latter being the context relevant to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Schelling and George wrote under the inspiration of the bipolar reality of the Cold War, while Morgenthau wrote in the shadow of World War II and the Cold War's initial emergence. Despite this, their approach toward diplomatic power – with its
advantages and disadvantages – remains relevant in examining the crisis with Iran, since the need for combining various measures to realize its potential has not changed.

In applying this framework, Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06) examine the dismantling of Libya's non-conventional capabilities. Like George (1991), they express some doubt regarding coercive diplomacy's chances of success – but also challenge the value of threatening the use of force. They conclude (based on George and Simons, 1994) that a coercion strategy is likely to succeed when the non-compliance costs that can be imposed on a target state – as well as the compliance benefits offered – exceed the benefits of non-compliance. Achieving a balance between these depends on the implementation of three criteria: proportionality (the affinity between the scope of the objectives and the means to attain them); reciprocity (the two sides' understanding of the connection between the carrots of the coercing side and the concessions of the target state); and the credibility of the coercing side (conveying a persuasive message to the target state regarding the ramifications of non-compliance).

The authors Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06) take into account a complex and multi-state reality. They believe that attaining a balance among these three components becomes more of a possibility if the other main global players are supportive, and provided local opposition on the side of the coercing party is limited. It follows that international and local contexts are as important as a substantive strategy. They add that military and even economic superiority is insufficient, and by way of example point out that American coercive diplomacy failed in the majority of cases examined by
George and Simons (1994), despite the fact that the US was a central player in leading efforts against militarily inferior countries.

Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06) propose examining the target state's internal eco-political situation in the context of its motivation to comply or not. They emphasize that on the political level, leaders want first and foremost to remain in power (whether in democratic regimes or not), and therefore the regime of a target state will be concerned primarily with the question of whether non-compliance serves its national security interests.

A second consideration in this context: an economic calculation of the price exacted by sanctions and even the use of force in the case of non-compliance, as compared with the benefits of trade and other economic incentives in the case of compliance. The role of elites constitutes a third consideration: if compliance is to harm their interests, they will act against external pressure – but will press the regime to comply if the opposite is the case.

While the sources reviewed above clearly vary in their approach regarding the success of coercive diplomacy, the differences appear to be more of nuance than substance. They all agree that an effort should be made to strike a balance maximizing the potency of diplomatic tools – as opposed to the outright use of brute force.

**Military Coercion**
The military coercer's main challenge is convincing the adversary that compliance with demands is preferable to rejecting them (Pape, 1996; a similar principle is put forward by Jentleson and Whytock, 2005/06).

The inclusion of the threat of military force by Morgenthau (1948) - and others following him - as an integral part of what he calls "intelligent diplomacy intent upon preserving peace" (together with persuasion and compromise) requires at least a cursory examination of military coercion.

Pape (1996) delineates two types of military coercion, differentiating between coercion and deterrence (based on a similar distinction made decades earlier by Schelling, 1966, as previously mentioned):

* Coercion by punishment that raises costs or risks to the adversary's population, whether by harming civilians or extensively killing military forces in order to exploit the adversary's sensitivity to casualties.
* Coercion by denial, that is employing military means to prevent the adversary from attaining political or territorial goals.

According to Pape (1996), the success of military coercion is a result of a reciprocal relationship between the strategy of the coercive side, the military strategy of the target state and its internal politics. In this context, he believes that an examination of the chances for success of military coercion must focus on the target state's decision-making process, which is influenced by the linkage between the coercing side's military strategy and the vulnerabilities of the target state.
Pape (1996) broadens his general reference to military coercion to the use of air power – an issue pertinent to this study, if only because of the prevalent belief that any act of force against Iran’s nuclear sites is likely to include a significant aerial component. According to Pape, air power constitutes a vitally important component in the annals of the implementation of military coercion, finding its expression in coercion strategies that conform with the objectives of punishment and denial (mentioned above). Air power also represents the most useful vehicle in examining what causes the success or failure of coercion.

Byman, Waxman and Larson (1999), writing against the background of the first Gulf War and the war in Kosovo, claim that air power can fulfill a central role in successful coercion. This, through its ability to destroy a range of targets and its growing capabilities in the areas of intelligence and precision targeting, which offer new options for political and military decision making. They add, however, that complete success is not guaranteed: even if a certain target is destroyed, a change in conduct – which is the intention of coercion – does not always occur. The reason for such a negative result does not lie solely in the military sphere, but can also be found in realms dealing with culture, psychology and organizational behavior.

De Nevers (2007) does not rely on the theoretical literature reviewed thus far, but her examination of the global powers’ imposition of international norms is certainly relevant to this study. In her opinion, powers tend to implement coercion against weak states, while preferring means of persuasion against stronger ones. In this context, she offers the following
categorization regarding a country's international status: insider states, outsider states, and contested status states.

The author also categorizes the element of force, as follows:

* Weak states, with limited ability to defend themselves, especially against powers;
* Strong countries/powers, the main players in the international arena;
* Protected states, which maintain alliances with strong countries;
* Defensive countries, which are sufficiently capable of defending themselves and their interests – at least by raising the cost of an attack against them – even if they are not particularly strong.

While the issue warrants its own analysis, for the purposes of this study Iran appears to fit into the category of a contested status state which is also a defensive country – mainly due to its military (and asymmetrical) capabilities, but perhaps also against the backdrop of its potential ability to withhold its vast energy resources.

De Nevers (2007) concludes that the combination of a target state's international status and its strength vis-à-vis a threatening power explains the use of force (or lack thereof) by powers seeking to advance certain norms. Her analysis also leads to the conclusion that the use of force does not guarantee a successful change of norms; and even when this change is enacted, the process can be quite protracted. De Never's conclusions are likely to help in understanding the EU3's approach to the use of force (and even that of the US).
Nuclear Reversal

Any examination of diplomatic power in the Iranian nuclear crisis would be incomplete without reference to the EU3's stated goal (certainly at the start): nuclear reversal. Levite (2002/03) defines nuclear reversal as a situation in which states set out on a road leading to a nuclear weapon, but on the way reverse their steps as part of a government decision – even if they do not altogether abandon their aspirations. His definition includes cases in which there is no government decision to reflect either the launching of the program or the backtracking afterward, in view of the nature of most nuclear programs: potential proliferator states usually do not make a formal decision to acquire or forego a nuclear weapon until the very moment they have to.

According to Levite (2002/03), national leaderships ordinarily hesitate to formally commit to acquiring nuclear weapons (even if the intention is clear) until exhausting an assessment of the technological, financial and political (internal/external) feasibility. Premature decisions are considered politically risky and, more importantly, strategically and politically unnecessary since the absence of a formal decision does not prevent the development of a standby capability to develop a nuclear weapon. Movement in the direction of reversal is gradual, and the sign-off very rarely precedes a clarification of the tradeoffs and minimizing of risks.

Levite identifies several basic factors that lead to reversal as a result of a reduction in the profitability of a nuclear weapon (in the decision-maker's view):
* An improvement in the state's external security situation or the appearance of alternatives to a nuclear weapon that makes it unnecessary;
* A change in the regime and its security and/or economic orientation;
* State or structural motivation (such as new norms).

While motives vary from case to case, the author believes a prominent common denominator exists: political considerations (as opposed to economic and technical) are what restrains most states that are capable of developing a nuclear weapon. Among the political components that play a dominant role in this process, external security concerns stand out for their profound influence (even if, as mentioned, they do not stand alone). A more extensive analysis of the implementation of diplomatic power vis-à-vis Iran should take Levite's determination into consideration.

Another relevant conclusion of Levite (2002/03) is that the time dimension constitutes an important factor in any effort to instigate nuclear reversal. In his view, a long corridor of time – a decade or more between embarking on the road and acquiring capabilities – creates the opportunity to influence a program's direction from the outside. Such a corridor leaves room for the emergence of internal and external circumstances acting against continuation of a program – or in favor of an opening to external incentives for change.

Of course, another possibility should be considered together with that of the author: this same long corridor is liable to allow the proliferator state to exploit the time dimension in order to continue the program. Such a reality is extremely relevant to this study, which determines that the time dimension in the Iranian nuclear crisis worked in Tehran's favor (inter alia, because close
to 20 years passed between the program's launching and exposure of the activities).

Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss (2004) make note of both the incentives and drawbacks at the disposal of states in deciding whether or not to develop nuclear weapons. Regarding incentives, they emphasize the desire to deter or even compel adversaries, the search for increased security vis-à-vis regional or global rivals, the status and prestige associated with acquiring command of nuclear technology, internal politics, as well as bureaucratic ambition. As for the obstacles, they focus on financial cost, technological difficulty, internal opposition, damage to important bilateral relationships or collective security alliances, as well as global non-proliferation norms.

According to the authors, since the mid-90s the balance of incentives vis-à-vis obstacles leans toward incentives – with new threats weakening the nuclear taboo. WMD-related technologies increasingly spread during this period, while the non-proliferation regime – meant to deal with this danger – suffered erosion.

As illustrated above, theoretical literature on coercive diplomacy has followed a natural progression flowing from the conclusion of WWII, through the Cold War and into the eye of the increasingly complex – and dangerous – spread of WMD. Originally an effort ostensibly meant to deal with an adversary possessing conventional weapons, it has now evolved into an urgent need to formulate ways to stop nuclear and other non-conventional weapons. This development has made the search for workable coercive diplomacy theory all the more vital.

The International Dimension
The fact that the above theoretical literature dealing with coercion originates in the US is no coincidence: the European viewpoint has significantly differed from the American one.

Nye (1991) was critical of this when he noted in the early '90s that the US is not only the strongest country militarily and economically, but also in the context of soft power. Nye defined soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion," adding that such power "can be developed through relations with allies, economic assistance and cultural exchanges." Later on Nye (2004) sharpened his criticism of what he considered the neglect of soft power potential by the US itself.

In this context, Manners (2002) emphasizes that the European Union's global political identity is closely connected with its normative worldview, a process deeply rooted in its historical development – and accelerated during the Cold War. According to Manners, at the root of the EU's normative foundation lies five main issues comprising the center of relations within the EU as well as its ties with the rest of the world: the centrality of peace; the concepts of liberty, democracy, and the rule of law; and respect for human rights.

Manners further maintains that the EU disseminates its normative basis in various ways also relevant to this study: without any specific, intentional effort; orderly spread of information; formalization of relations with third countries, creating openings for exporting norms or employing sticks through economic sanctions or carrots via financial benefits (this is perhaps the best model with which to view the Iranian crisis); transfer of goods or
assistance to third countries; physical presence in countries or organizations; and the utilization of a "cultural filter" (such as the dissemination of human rights principles in Turkey).

Against the backdrop of the various means described, Manners concludes that the EU constitutes a "normative power" - differing from a military power on the one hand, and a civilian power on the other - which doesn't only alter norms in the international arena but rather actively tries to effect normative change (as it should, in her opinion). Manners further believes that the EU implements its normative power as part of its efforts to reshape international norms to its liking, and is prepared to impinge upon the sovereignty of other states.

Smith (2005) takes Manner's perspective one step further: she examines those modus operandi of the EU intended to effect normative changes in the international arena, thus moving this study closer to an understanding of the EU's view of coercion. According to Smith, since the mid-'90s the EU is demonstrating an increasing readiness to coerce third countries to perform certain acts by way of conditionality, which has become a familiar component in its foreign relations. Smith believes that two kinds of conditionality exist, positive and negative:

* Positive conditionality – a promise of benefits to a state if it complies with the required conditions;
* Negative conditionality – a reduction, suspension or cancelation of such benefits if the state in question violates the conditions.

According to Smith, the EU feels comfortable operating in the sphere of
positive conditionality – financial assistance, for instance - despite some difficulties involved (such as delivering at the expected speed, or providing those incentives actually most desired by the receiving end).

In comparison, the EU faces more difficulties when it comes to negative conditionality (such as sanctions); attempts to mobilize consensus among its members for a tough stand can often result in a lack of consistency vis-à-vis states that violate its conditions. In cases where negative measures are leveled against certain states but not against others, the explanation is usually tied to the relative strategic and commercial importance of the country in question (a comment similar to that of De Nevers, 2007 regarding the use of military force) but also to serious doubts within the EU concerning the merits of sanctions or other negative steps.

In this context, the 'European Security Strategy' (ESS, 2003) represents the link connecting the examination of the theoretical material and the EU3's actual conduct in the Iranian nuclear crisis. From the outset, the document makes clear the EU's goals in the international arena: "The increasing integration of European interests and the strengthening of the EU's mutual solidarity make it a more credible and effective player. Europe must be ready to bear responsibility for global security and for building a better world."

The document further delineates the main threats facing Europe: Terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. It emphasizes, inter alia, the following principles in guiding its action: in an era of globalization distant threats are as concerning as those near at hand; the first line of defense is beyond the sea; none of the new threats are purely military, and they cannot be confronted solely with military means – each of them requires a combination of tools, and the EU is well-equipped to deal with variegated situations.
In addition, the document states that Europe's security and prosperity increasingly depend on the international multilateral arena, in which the UN Security Council is the body primarily responsible for preserving security and peace.

On this last point, in the opinion of Smith (2005) it is unclear how much authorization from the Security Council is necessary for the EU to enforce "effective multilateralism." This is not a trivial matter, in her view: "this complex issue can determine whether the world will consider the EU a passive force or one that tends to break international norms as it sees fit – if not to redesign them "together with other north/affluent states, for the sake of its own interests."

Smith's question assumes special meaning when examining the EU3's conduct in the Iranian nuclear crisis. In theory, if not necessarily in practice, the EU's WMD strategy (EU External Relations website, 2003) is supposed to provide the response in the WMD context. The document is based on three central principles: WMD and their means of delivery threatens international peace and security; the EU cannot ignore this danger and must seek an effective multilateral response – the cornerstone of European strategy; the EU must make use of all its tools to prevent, deter, stop and if possible eliminate proliferation programs that arouse concern in the global context.

The document adds several sub-clauses to these principles, according to which nurturing a stable international and regional environment is a requirement for fighting WMD proliferation; close cooperation with key partners is essential for the success of the global struggle against proliferation; and rigorous action against proliferator states will make
multilateralism more effective.

All the document's parts can be summed up into a European strategy that makes the international framework paramount, but also allots the EU a central role in achieving the goal. It proposes combined use of a variety of international tools such as multilateral conventions and verification mechanisms, export control regimes, political and economic leverage, intercept action, and coercion measures in accordance with the UN Charter as the last resort. In this context, it is worthy to note the suggested order of action: all political and diplomatic measures (conventions and regimes) constitute the first line of defense. Only after they fail is consideration to be given to coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – including sanctions, intercept of cargo and even the use of force "as appropriate."

It should be noted that publication of these EU security documents was received as part of the natural course of events within the framework of the European discourse which was already taking place at the time. For example, Steve Everts from the Center for European Reform writes (Everts, 2003) that consolidation of the strategy demonstrates that the EU is capable of learning from its failures, creating a “new realism” which permeates its foreign policy discussions. Everts praises European recognition of the need to leverage its policy in areas such as commerce, in order to provide support for its political goals while using “conditionality”. He points to the immediate relevancy of the new strategy: “Iran will be the test case for the security strategy. EU leaders need to demonstrate that the strategy is not just well-meaning verbiage but real in its consequences, and that a different approach to international affairs can deliver better, more lasting results.”6
Tertrais (2003) expands on the issue and enumerates his recommended modus operandi for the EU: positioning “conditionality” at the center of its policy; turning it into a body that leads in promoting norms of international law in the area of non-proliferation; only infrequently leveling sanctions – and even then, in small portions; improving EU efforts to fight proliferation “from the source” (he mentions Russia in this context); preparing to use force in certain instances; and making the Iranian case a matter of top priority. Tertrais offers three reasons for choosing Iran: its proximity to Europe; the fact that its nuclear program is only in its initial stages provides sufficient time to stop it; the EU possesses effective means to apply against Tehran. In this context, he emphasizes that the EU must make clear to Iran that normalization of relations between them depends on Tehran’s cessation of all illicit nuclear activities.

**United States**

Examination of the US approach to the implementation of coercive diplomacy is critical to this study. Almost a decade before the Iranian crisis took center stage, Kissinger (1994) emphasized that in the new emerging world order the US – for the first time – will not be able to play a dominant role in the world, even if it cannot withdraw from the international community. He further noted that the US is unaccustomed to operating within a “balance of power system,” a model which characterizes international efforts to implement coercive diplomacy against Iran. In Kissinger’s opinion, in the post-Cold War world Washington’s relative military power will gradually diminish, there will be a reduction in the number of areas in which military force is at all relevant, and the new situation will bear more of a resemblance to conditions familiar to Europe
Kissinger also considers the US policy of projecting power into an array of world crises to be an ideological challenge of the first order for American foreign policy. His analysis has practical significance for this study, in view of the importance attached to the combination of diplomatic power and the threat of force, as discussed by Morgenthau (1948), Schelling (1966), George (1991) and others. Regarding non-proliferation, Levite (2002/03) believes that the US played a significant role in attaining “nuclear reversal” in certain cases. He attaches importance to the administration’s commitment since WWII to devote its power to such rollback on the one hand, but also to the lack of leverage on the considerations and the internal forces that influence states’ nuclear aspirations on the other hand. He notes in particular in this context that the US did not succeed in altering the nuclear aspirations of Iran, Iraq and Libya – even though, in his opinion, Washington did manage to slow the pace of their programs by blocking their access to fissile material as well as to production technologies and to relevant facilities.7 Toward the end of 2002 the US National Security Council released a document elaborating on how Washington should confront WMD threats. The strategy laid out is interesting in and of itself, but also as a basis for comparison with the EU’s principles on the same issue. While the EU places the international multilateral framework at the top of the action pyramid, the American document places the US itself at the top of three primary spheres of initiated action: counter-proliferation, including interception, deterrence, defense and disarmament; non-proliferation, including active diplomacy, multilateral regimes and supervision of nuclear material, controls of exports in the US, and sanctions; and management of the results of WMD use.
The NSC document suggests the following ways to integrate the above spheres: improving intelligence gathering and analysis; R&D; strengthening international cooperation; and “focused strategies” against proliferators. At the end of the day, the principles laid out in the document reflect how senior administration officials handled the Iranian nuclear crisis between 2003-2004 – a fact that helps to illuminate the differing approaches between the US and the EU during this period.

Against this backdrop, Carter (2004) proposes an American counter-proliferation policy combining elements of US and EU strategy: placing fissile material out of the reach of rogues, strengthening non-proliferation conventions, utilizing new technologies, and employing intrusive supervision in order to obtain better intelligence. In his view, a non-proliferation policy must include dissuasion – that is, “getting as many countries as possible not to develop WMD in the first place.” Such dissuasion would be accomplished through a deal: “providing security in exchange for non-proliferation.”

Since the motivation behind proliferation efforts varies from state to state, tools need to be combined. In this context, Carter (2004) recalls Morgenthau (1948) in arguing that a policy relying on solely one tool is “foolhardy.” In Carter’s view, the US is correct in offering security as a basis for dissuasion and non-proliferation. When these fail to have influence, American diplomacy can perhaps prevent movement toward WMD. According to Carter, at the time of his writing, the administration was not acting according to this model in the case of Iran (and North Korea) – that is, the US was not offering “strong incentives” in exchange for compliance, and therefore was not attaining its goal. Carter admits there are states that in any case will advance toward WMD, and in such cases the preferred course of action is denial (such as through strengthened enforcement of suppliers regime
agreements, and use of clandestine activities). Like the EU, he views the use of force as the option of last resort, only to be employed when the use of WMD by a rogue state is imminent (the question of imminence is a discussion in itself, albeit beyond the scope of this study).

In contrast to Levite (2002/03), Campbell et al. (2004) assert that the US can influence Iran, determining that it must bring Tehran’s leaders around to the conclusion that they will attain their national objectives only by an unequivocal abandonment of their nuclear weapons program. They propose a mixture of carrots and sticks, including civilian nuclear incentives, as well as the US refraining from supporting regime change.

Concerning the threat of force, Campbell et al. (2004) believe the administration’s hesitancy vis-à-vis Iran (as well as North Korea and Libya) indicates that military tools are likely to suit non-proliferation goals only rarely – even if this option must not be removed from the table. In other words, some pressure – whether diplomatic, economic or even military – is necessary to attain a reasonable solution vis-à-vis rogue states.

As indicated above, the EU and the US approach the issue of coercive diplomacy from different directions – a fact naturally reflected by the literature itself. On the one hand, a newly empowered Europe seeking to expand its influence by advancing the principles of multilateralism – with itself at the epicenter; on the other hand, a longtime empowered America guarding against an approach which could force it to share the top of the pyramid, to relinquish cherished principles – and even assets. The challenge for coercive diplomacy theory: to suggest a third way, by identifying and developing a workable common denominator between these two polar opposites.
Chapter Conclusion

The above review of theoretical literature illustrates the various approaches and tools proposed for dealing with WMD threats. Alongside the differences of opinion, there is agreement on the need for determined implementation of coercive diplomacy and modus operandi that reflect such determination. At the end of the day, the key is the ability of coercive diplomacy implemented in a multi-state format to bring about Iranian nuclear reversal – and the necessity for the threat of force to ensure the success of diplomatic coercion. It is ill advised to forego any of the elements composing the European and American approaches, particularly in view of their strengths and weaknesses – as emphasized by Joschka Fischer (2008), German foreign minister during the early years of the Iranian nuclear crisis:

Europe's global influence is feeble because of its internal quarrels and lack of unity, which weakens the union and limits its ability to act. Objectively strong, subjectively infirm: that is how the EU's present condition can be described.

He adds:

America's current weakness coincides with a substantially changed international political environment - defined largely by the limits of US power, Europe's ineffectiveness, and the emergence of new global giants like China and India.

Despite the differences in approach between the EU and the US, it emerges from this review that successful implementation of coercive diplomacy vis-
à-vis WMD threats in a changing world necessarily requires the two sides to work together.
The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, 2003-2004

Despite certain differences in theoretical literature, a common denominator does emerge with regard to the basic components necessary to successfully implement coercive diplomacy (motivation, credibility, balance, etc.) and the difficulties presented by the threat of the use of force. The following analysis of EU policy in negotiations with Iran examines the research question and the assumptions against the backdrop of this common denominator. As noted at the outset of this study, the research question examines how the implementation of coercive diplomacy by the EU3 in this crisis applied the principles of diplomatic coercion.

There is no consensus as to why the EU3 decided to launch their initiative. The possibilities vary: to curb Iran’s nuclear program, to prevent the use of force against Iran (against the backdrop of the second Gulf war), to strengthen the EU’s role as a player in global political-military crises, to preserve regional stability in the Middle East, to take advantage of an opportunity to build a future relationship with Iran – or a combination of the above. Uncertainty also surrounds the question of whether the EU3 acted to totally stop the Iranian nuclear program, solely to delay it – or perhaps the delay was supposed to lead to a total cessation.

Not only is Europe’s motive ambiguous, the very “ownership” of the idea is unclear: Was it even originally a European initiative? Or perhaps the notion was conceived by an Iranian regime feeling increasing pressure against the backdrop of a widening IAEA inquiry, European insistence it cooperate with the agency – as well as US action against Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan? The response to this question depends, inter alia, on another – also open to interpretation: When exactly did the EU3 initiative begin (late 2002, early 2003 or later that year)?
Judging by information published during the relevant period – as well as interviews conducted by the author with individuals personally involved with the crisis at the time – it appears that the EU3 did not implement the required elements as stipulated by the main body of literature reviewed above with regard to coercive diplomacy. This is particularly true regarding the following components: applying the combination of persuasion, compromise and the threat of force – each at the appropriate time (Morgenthau, 1948); determination, including sustained punishment and even the use of violence (Schelling, 1966); a higher level of motivation to effect change than that of the adversary to oppose such change (George, 1991); and combining of all these so as to convince the adversary that the cost of non-compliance is higher than its benefits (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005/06).

As for the implementation of non-proliferation principles, it remains unclear just how much the EU3 states took nuclear reversal elements into consideration in their activities – especially the link between the adversary’s external security situation and its deciding to step back from its nuclear program. Furthermore, it is uncertain how much they took into account the fact that the time factor is a two-way street: on the one hand facilitating efforts to stop a nuclear program, but on the other hand providing the adversary with time to advance it.
The EU3’s Implementation of Coercive Diplomacy

In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group called the “National Resistance Council” revealed the existence of facilities for uranium enrichment at Natanz and heavy-water production at Arak. Exposure of Natanz launched a cat-and-mouse game (Bergman, 2007) between Iran and the IAEA: the latter demanded that Iran produce all information on its nuclear advances to that point, while Tehran – which did not want to be ostracized in the international arena, as was North Korea – provided some details, albeit limited and contradictory.

Following the Iranian opposition group’s revelation, the EU launched a number of actions which, over time, positioned it as the leader of the international community’s efforts on the issue. In this context, the EU3 foreign ministers visited Tehran on October 21, 2003 in order to conduct direct negotiations with the regime leading to the signing of the Tehran Agreement (Britain, France and Germany, 2003). According to the document, Iran agreed - in exchange for further negotiations – to suspend its enrichment program, as well as to sign and implement the Additional Protocol (the signature took place on December 18, but the Iranian parliament – the Majlis – never ratified the signature). Tehran thus avoided non-compliance with the IAEA’s resolution of November 26, a pattern which was to repeat itself throughout the crisis.

A year later, following a series of disputes, on October 21, 2004 the EU3 offered Iran a new deal which included broader negotiations, economic benefits and the supply of light water reactors. This resulted in the Paris Agreement, which was formally signed in Paris on November 14 (IAEA, 2004c). A dispute surrounding implementation emerged as early as January 2005.
Before examining the unfolding of the crisis, special attention should be given to comments by Joschka Fischer (2006), German foreign minister at the time, regarding the motive behind the EU3 initiative:

“Iran's acquisition of a nuclear bomb -- or even its ability to produce one -- would be interpreted by Israel as a fundamental threat to its existence, thereby compelling the West, and Europe in particular, to take sides. Europe has not only historical moral obligations to Israel but also security interests that link it to the strategically vital Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, a nuclear Iran would be perceived as a threat by its other neighbors, which would probably provoke a regional arms race and fuel regional volatility further. In short, nuclear Iran would call Europe's fundamental security into question. To believe that Europe could keep out of this conflict is a dangerous illusion.”

Fischer himself admits that the initiative failed, and attempts to explain why:

In this crisis, the stakes are high, which is why Germany, Britain and France began negotiations with Iran two years ago with the goal of persuading it to abandon its efforts to close the nuclear fuel cycle. This initiative failed for two reasons. First, the European offer to open up technology and trade, including the peaceful use of nuclear technology, was disproportionate to Iran's fundamental fear of regime change on the one hand and its regional hegemonic aspirations and quest for global prestige on the other. Second, the disastrous U.S.-led war in Iraq has caused Iran's leaders to conclude that the leading Western power has been weakened to the point that it is dependent on Iran's goodwill and that high oil prices have made the West all the more wary of a serious confrontation.
The Iranian regime's analysis may prove to be a dangerous miscalculation, because it is likely to lead sooner rather than later to a 'hot' confrontation that Iran simply cannot win. After all, the issue at the heart of this conflict is this: Who dominates the Middle East -- Iran or the United States?

The following analysis examines in detail precisely how EU3 coercive diplomacy policy implementation went wrong.
Demands and Realization

The principle figures writing about coercive diplomacy attach great importance to the nature of the demand to be imposed on the opponent, as well as the manner in which the demand is realized. As mentioned, George (1991) refers to essential sub-components in this context, such as the means used to create a sense of urgency, the threat made, the possible use of incentives, and the affinity between words and deeds. Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06) add to these the importance of support on the part of all the parties involved in the coercion effort, the credibility of the coercion, reciprocity and proportionality. Meanwhile, Schelling (1966) states that the coercive side should be uncompromising vis-à-vis the opponent, including by imposing sustained punishment (and even by using violence).

The EU3’s implementation of diplomatic power will be examined against the backdrop of these determinations.

From the outset of the crisis, the European Union made clear its consistent demand that Iran sign the Additional Protocol, suspecting that Tehran’s nuclear program was intended for military purposes. The demand was not tied to the potential threat to global peace and security, however, but rather to the broader normative context familiar from the EU WMD strategy document. To illustrate the point: In early February 2003 Chris Patten, then EU Commissioner for External Relations, said during a visit to Tehran that Iran still seeks to acquire WMD and therefore its signing the Additional Protocol “would send a most positive message, setting a regional lead and underlining serious international commitment.”
As the year unfolded the crisis escalated in the face of two main developments: then-President Khatami’s February confirmation that his country did in fact possess an enrichment program for some time; and Iran’s recovery from the shockwaves of the US-UK military action in Iraq in March. From June onward the EU demand appeared to harden as the extent of Tehran’s concealment efforts became increasingly apparent (as documented by the IAEA director general reports).

In their June 2003 decision (GAERC, 2003a), the EU’s foreign ministers clearly tied the signing and implementation of the Additional Protocol to Iran’s efforts to complete the nuclear fuel cycle (in view of Khatami’s earlier statement). Their sense of urgency was conveyed by the IAEA’s very handling of the crisis file – with all that this entailed, since one possible outcome could be UN Security Council action. The incentive and/or punishment in question – economic - is also spelled out in their conclusions:

… deepening of economic and commercial relations between the EU and Iran should be matched by similar progress in all other aspects of the EU’s relations with Iran… in particular the need for significant positive developments on human rights, non-proliferation, terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process.

Even at this early stage of the crisis, it emerges from documentation that the EU attached much greater importance to developments than the IAEA’s Board of Governors (BoG). For example, the June 19 BoG session ended in a statement (IAEA, 2003a) by the chair – as opposed to a formal resolution, considered more serious – emphasizing that “the Board encouraged Iran, pending the resolution of related outstanding issues, not to introduce nuclear material at the pilot enrichment plant, as a confidence-building measure.”
The statement concludes by asking the IAEA director general “to provide a further report on the situation whenever appropriate.”

The statement’s wording barely touched the essence of the June 6 IAEA director general’s report (IAEA 2003b), which detailed several instances of concealment and failure to cooperate – including those discovered since revelations by the Iranian opposition group – and stated among its findings that “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.”

Despite the severity of the situation, it cannot be ruled out that at this early stage of formulating EU3 policy vis-à-vis Iran tension existed between the need to implement diplomatic power – particularly coercive diplomacy – and the normative view (including the absolute commitment to global non-proliferation regimes as embodied in EU security policy in general and the WMD strategy in particular).

This tension is noticeable, for example, in comments by Greece’s representative – speaking on behalf of the EU (EU Statement, 2003b) – which stresses that “any misuse of civilian nuclear programs would constitute a violation of obligations” under the NPT; and calls on Iran “to follow the internationally applied norms on peace and security both at the international and regional levels” as part of its own interests.

Particularly interesting is the comment regarding Iran’s supposed interest in following such international norms. In fact, this EU call is not supported by the array of considerations that lead a state to develop nuclear weapons – certainly not from Tehran’s perspective, with US forces already in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Sensing that Iran was not sufficiently cooperating with the IAEA, and certainly that it was not fulfilling EU demands, on July 21 the GAERC took advantage of its periodic declaration on the nuclear crisis in order to clarify the deadline for compliance with these demands (GAERC 2003b):

The Council decided to review future steps of the co-operation between EU and Iran in September in view of further developments particularly with regard to the second report of IAEA Director General, [Mohamed] ElBaradei, the IAEA evaluations and the possible conclusions of the Board of Governors of this Agency.

Clarifying the deadline represents one of the essential components for the success of diplomatic power, especially when accompanied by a threat such as disruption of economic ties. Of course, it is no less important for the coercing side to honor its own deadline and introduce some act of power if the deadline passes without compliance.

It is noteworthy that, according to Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2012) – a senior member of Iran’s negotiating team at the time - Tehran was at this point still nowhere close to a decision to sign the Additional Protocol, a central international demand (a fact reinforced a month after the GAERC declaration in separate August letters from the EU3 and Russia). In his account, soon after an early July visit to Iran by ElBaradei, Mousavian met with the supreme leader’s adviser on foreign affairs Ali Akbat Velayati, who told him that “Iran would not accept the Additional Protocol.” As Mousavian recalls, Velayati equated the Additional Protocol with the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai, “viewed by Iranians today as a betrayal and a black mark in their history.”

The September 12 BoG resolution (IAEA, 2003c) constituted a diplomatic step-up as compared with the previous June statement by the chair, but did
not include the most significant sanction at its disposal: transfer of the nuclear crisis file to the UN Security Council. Instead, the decision reiterated the June call on Iran “to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities, including the further introduction of nuclear material into Natanz, and, as a confidence-building measure, any reprocessing activities (…)” Nevertheless, the resolution does include an attempt to weave into the process a sense of urgency and to create a clear time frame for the hoped-for compliance. In this context, the decision emphasizes that it is “essential and urgent” for Iran to take a number of steps by the end of October - including providing a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the enrichment program, granting unrestricted access to the IAEA to inspect any site it deem necessary, “resolving questions regarding the conclusion of Agency experts that process testing on gas centrifuges must have been conducted,” complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments, and any other measure required by the IAEA to advance its work.

The lengthy list of demands attested to the extent of Iranian concealment, as well as to the IAEA’s information gaps, and left no room for doubt as to what was expected from Tehran. The nature of the threat – a request from the IAEA director general to submit a report that would allow the BoG to “draw definitive conclusions” (IAEA 2003c) - was alluded to and somewhat opaque, even though Iran certainly could have interpreted this as hinting at transfer of the file to the UN Security Council.

According to Mousavian (2012), the resolution succeeded in conveying a sense of urgency to Tehran: “A great crisis engulfed the country.” Emphasizing that “Iran was in no way prepared to handle the consequences” of a referral of its case to the Security Council, and expressing Iranian fears that the issue “would threaten the country with isolation and transform the
dispute into a matter of international security,” Mousavian delineates his country’s goals as including: Do away with the threat of BoG reporting Iran’s nuclear case to the Security Council; diminish international community opposition to an Iranian nuclear program in principle; address concerns about the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities; lay the groundwork for the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran; reduce world public opinion hostility to Iran; and pursue a long-term strategy of “turning threats into opportunities.”

Meanwhile, at this stage – more than a year after the crisis hit the headlines – the international community still had not fulfilled the three main criteria for successful implementation of diplomatic power. It made use of too few means of coercion with respect to the objectives it sought to attain (proportionality); it did not convey a persuasive message regarding the ramifications of non-compliance (credibility of coercion); and it also did not sufficiently clarify the affinity between the concessions it demanded, transparency, access and information – on the one hand – and the carrots it was likely to provide in return on the other hand (reciprocity).

In other words, at this point the international community was not leading Iran toward the understanding that the benefits of compliance outweighed the benefits of non-compliance.

While the BoG moved slowly to clarify its intentions – illustrating the difficulty of implementing diplomatic power in a multi-state reality – the EU’s foreign ministers began carrying out their threats in the face of Tehran’s continued non-compliance. In their September 29 statement (GAERC, 2003c), the Council expressed its concern with the lack of progress in four areas: human rights, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and the Middle East peace process. They emphasized that “more intense economic relations can be achieved only if progress is reached in the four
areas of concern,” adding that they would revert to the issue “and review future steps in the light of the next report” by the IAEA director general. Thus the EU actually did carry out its June threat and froze contacts with Tehran for a trade and cooperation agreement, forming a connection between advancing relations and the extent of Iranian compliance with IAEA demands.

The EU’s modus operandi, together with an Iranian fear that the November BoG resolution would transfer its file to the Security Council, led to the Tehran visit by the EU3 foreign ministers. The visit concluded with the October 21 signing of an agreed statement called the “Tehran Agreement” (Britain, France and Germany, 2003) which on the face of it attained the ministers’ goals: Iran made a commitment “to engage in full cooperation with the IAEA to address and resolve through full transparency all requirements and outstanding issues of the Agency and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA.” Iran also agreed to sign the Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures – and even to cooperate with the IAEA in tandem with it even before ratification – as well as to “voluntarily” suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities “as defined by the IAEA.”

Concerning reciprocity, the EU3’s foreign ministers informed Iran that their governments recognize its right “to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy” in accordance with the NPT. They added that full implementation of Iran’s decision, verified by the IAEA’s director general, “should enable the immediate situation to be resolved” by the BoG. In other words: normalization of the file and non-transfer to the Security Council, paving the way for dialogue based on longer-term cooperation; easier access to modern technology and supplies in a number of areas; continued cooperation with Iran in promoting regional security and stability, including the establishment
of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East “in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations.”

Maybe this last clause was intended (perhaps like Patten’s comments in February of that year) to deal, inter alia, with Iran’s fears stemming from the US military presence along its borders in the Gulf and Afghanistan, and/or its possible fear of Israel. This line of thought is confirmed by ElBaradei (2011), as well as Mousavian (2012):

During the October negotiations, [British Foreign Minister] Straw and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer told me that the objective of EU3 engagement with Iran was to serve as a ‘human shield’ to prevent an American or Israeli military strike.

Indeed, Straw emphasized in a November 9, 2004 debate in the British Parliament (Straw, 2004) that the EU3 ministers did agree in the “Tehran Agreement” to refrain from transferring the file to the Security Council, in return for creating a process in which Iran could rectify its failure to comply with its commitments in accordance with the NPT. He added, however, that the EU3 and the entire EU repeatedly emphasized to the Iranian government that they reserve the right to refer the matter to the Security Council if Tehran does not carry out its promises.

With regard to coercion’s credibility, it must be noted that the agreement contained neither a time frame for Iran to fulfill its commitments nor any threat – explicit or implicit – in the event Tehran reneges on its part. And while the European side did not immediately provide concrete carrots, it did grant Iran the precious time dimension it so needed, i.e. by refraining from transferring the file to the Security Council via a BoG decision in November – thus also insinuating that the danger of a use of force had been placed
further on the back burner. In effect, the European side relinquished a means to create pressure, and in the end failed to capitalize on the importance of the correlation between word and deed.

This contention is confirmed in an address given by Hassan Rohani himself while still head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and its nuclear negotiating team in talks with the Europeans (Rohani, 2005). The Iranian claimed that the EU3 foreign ministers guaranteed in their Tehran meeting that they would oppose any American pressure to transfer the file to the Security Council if Iran presented the IAEA with a “full picture” of its nuclear activities in accordance with the BoG resolution.

Mousavian (2012) contributes further insight to this point, stating that the agreement “took the wind out of the sails of the American push for international convergence against Tehran’s interests,” and quoting the supreme leader as telling Iranian officials on November 3, 2003 that the diplomatic path chosen would assist Iran in preserving its nuclear technology. Mousavian claims that the EU3 ministers specifically assured Iran “they would use their Security Council vetoes if the United States managed to bring Iran’s case to New York,” calling this “a major international breakthrough” for his country. In his view, the EU3 both downgraded the September BoG resolution’s suspension demand from obligatory to voluntary – and also toned down the Additional Protocol demand.

Perhaps even more eye-opening, Mousavian reflects Tehran’s view that the negotiations demonstrated “Iran was a major power in the region.” Pursuant to the agreement with the EU3, the IAEA received an October 21 letter from Iran informing the agency of its decision to provide a "full picture" of its nuclear activities, acknowledging its use of nuclear material for centrifuge experimentation, and admitting that conversion
experimentation was conducted at the Kalaye Electric facility from 1999-2002 – including the use of UF6 (as well as "yellow cake"\textsuperscript{14}). Iran also revealed in the letter its intention to make use of metal-form uranium, not only in order to store UF6 (its previous claim) but also for a laser-based enrichment program. This was the first written Iranian reference to the enrichment program since its concealment efforts going back to February 2003.

In addition, Tehran admitted its intention to include two hot cells in the Arak reactor (in contrast with its previous contention). The Iranians also informed the Agency they had carried out previously unreported activities connected with plutonium.

After conveying this information, on November 10 Iran informed the IAEA of its intention to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities – particularly all activities at Natanz: neither feeding enrichment material nor importing enrichment-related components. It also agreed to sign the Additional Protocol.\textsuperscript{15} As a result, the November 26 BoG resolution welcomed Iran's announcement, also deciding that "should any further serious Iranian failures come to light" the BoG would convene immediately to consider "all options at its disposal." This phrase – and the veiled threat - was a reflection of the lack of confidence in Tehran in view of its concealment efforts until that time. However, just like previous threats this one would also have to stand the future test of coercion credibility.

The EU foreign ministers followed in the footsteps of the EU3 and the BoG. Their December 9 statement (GAERC, 2003d) reiterated the EU's readiness to widen political and economic cooperation with Iran, but making this conditional on developments in the four areas of concern. Iran, for its part, continued its efforts to convey a sense of cooperation: its December 29 letter informed the IAEA of its decision to suspend all activities involving
centrifuges with or without nuclear material in the Natanz pilot; to suspend all additional feeding of nuclear material into any centrifuges; to suspend the assembling of new centrifuges in the Natanz pilot and the installation of centrifuges in the Natanz enrichment facility; and, to the extent possible, to remove all nuclear material from every facility for enrichment by centrifuges. Iran also declared in the letter that except for Natanz it had no intention of establishing during the suspension period any type of facility for enrichment by centrifuges. Tehran added that it had dismantled all projects related to laser enrichment, removed all relevant equipment, and was not constructing or operating any facility for plutonium separation.

While Iran issued repeated declarations on its intentions but was much slower with implementation, in early 2004 the EU continued with the same modus operandi as in the previous year: without insisting on immediate implementation of Iran's commitments and without threatening any concrete punishment. On the contrary, the January 26 foreign ministers' statement (following High Commissioner Javier Solana's visit to Tehran) welcomed Iran's steps – particularly the signing and implementation of the Additional Protocol – and went no further than to guarantee continued monitoring of the situation.

Following a meeting in Brussels convened to iron out "misunderstandings" between the sides regarding Tehran Agreement implementation – the results of which Mousavian (2012) claims “increased Iran’s leverage” and “widened the transatlantic divide” - on February 24 Iran informed the IAEA that by the first week of March it would convey instructions regarding implementation of additional decisions it adopted: suspending the assembly of centrifuges and experimenting with them, suspending domestic production of centrifuge parts – including existing contractual arrangements – to the extent possible, and placing under IAEA seals components which
would still be manufactured in accordance with existing contracts. Iran also confirmed that suspension of all enrichment activities applied to all facilities in the country.

Rohani (2005) himself attested to the loss of Europe's sense of urgency and the credibility of its coercive measures. According to his version of events, Iran reached an understanding with the Europeans in the February Brussels meeting that in return for a certain expansion of the suspension the EU3 would remove the file from the IAEA agenda (a claim corroborated by Mousavian, 2012). If such an assurance was indeed given, it would have constituted a blow to the test of reciprocity\(^{17}\): the original European demand for the suspension was made following Tehran's concealment efforts and the need for Iran to regain international confidence; the demand was not made as part of a package deal in return for alleviating international pressure, such as refraining from transfer of the file to the Security Council or its removal from the IAEA agenda.

While the EU3 worked to advance the October 2003 Tehran Agreement, a new crisis arose when Iranian omissions from its October 21 letter to the IAEA – the same letter that used the term "full picture" - were discovered. Against this backdrop, the March 13 BoG resolution (IAEA, 2004a) called on Iran to expand the suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities "to all such activities throughout Iran," condemned it for omitting critical details in its letter, but at the same time decided to postpone its response to the June BoG meeting.\(^{18}\)

The BoG resolution was especially strong, as was the March 22 EU foreign ministers’ decision (GAERC, 2004a) which expressed grave concern about a number of open questions regarding the Iranian nuclear program. However, the postponement included in the BoG resolution – as well as the EU decision to “review future steps” in light of the latest IAEA director general
report - joined prior international decisions. They began to accumulate into a critical mass that clearly indicated a problem with the credibility of coercion, as well as a disconnect between words and deeds. Even if this development stemmed from the difficulty of attaining an international consensus that would have facilitated transfer of the file to the Security Council, in fact such a move was the only truly effective diplomatic punishment formally available in an international framework to those involved in the crisis at the time.

Iran did not take long to respond to this apparent weakness. On April 29 it updated the IAEA that it intended to conduct experimentation on its UF6 production line at the Isfahan conversion facility. Despite the Agency’s May 7 clarification that such a move would constitute the production of enrichment feed material (due to the quantity of nuclear material involved), Tehran responded on May 18 that it never made a commitment not to produce such material and added that its decision on a temporary and voluntary suspension did not include UF6 production. Thus Tehran challenged efforts to restrict its activities, apparently sensing that the international community did not intend to take truly drastic steps – a sense that was by now based on more than a year of experience.

The June 18 BoG resolution (IAEA, 2004b) detailed additional cases of Iranian violations and lack of cooperation. It called on Tehran "to correct all remaining shortcomings, and to remove the existing variance in relation to the Agency's understanding of the scope of Iran's decisions regarding suspension, including by refraining from the production of UF6 and from all production of centrifuge components, as well as to enable the Agency to verify fully the suspension." Furthermore, the BoG called on Iran to reconsider its decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan as well as its decision to start construction of
a research reactor moderated by heavy water. Contrary to what should have been expected, however, these calls did not include any threat – explicit or implicit – regarding the way forward from the BoG's perspective.

As professional literature on the subject of political power could have predicted, Iran responded in kind to the absence of a threat in the BoG resolution. Its June 23 letter to the IAEA director general informed the Agency of its intention to cancel the suspension measures it announced on February 24 – in other words, it would resume the production of centrifuge parts, the assembly of centrifuges and experimentation with them beginning June 29. In the absence of international backing, and left with no choice, the IAEA agreed in a June 29 letter to remove the seals19 from centrifuge-related equipment and material.

Interestingly enough, the Iranian version of these events – as put forward by Mousavian (2012) – attributes Tehran’s behavior to its sense that international demands were unreasonable and that the EU3 had not fulfilled its promises. Either way, it is clear that Iran had by this point mustered enough self-confidence to defy the world’s demands almost at will.

The September 18 BoG resolution (IAEA, 2004) asked Iran to restore the suspension under IAEA verification. It also called on Tehran to reconsider its decision to begin construction of a heavy water reactor, and expressed regret not only because the suspension’s implementation did not meet Agency expectations but also because Iran reneged on previously agreed-to areas of implementation. In addition, in view of circumstances, the BoG reiterated its threat – thus far not implemented – to decide at its November meeting whether to take other measures regarding Tehran's commitments to the Agency and the BoG as per previous resolutions.

In the view of Mousavian (2012), this decision revived the possibility of Security Council action, a development he attributes inter alia to negative
Iranian behavior (and not only to external circumstances). He emphasizes that “Iran was very angry, but determined.”

At this point a turnabout occurred – in the direction of increased Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, certainly, but also in a renewed outreach effort on the part of Europe. According to Mousavian (2012), during contacts in late July, Iran submitted a plan it called a “framework of mutual guarantees” with the goal of salvaging diplomacy with Europe without making concessions. He claims that a mid-October plan revealed by the EU3 was a direct, official response to the earlier proposal by Iran – which, ironically, proceeded to reject the European ideas while noting with satisfaction a number of gains in its favor. Tehran’s game, then, was to firmly maintain its own principles while drawing further European concessions. Against this backdrop, Tehran conveyed information to the Agency regarding the purchase of "magnets" for P2 centrifuges. Furthermore, following an inspection visit on October 11 the IAEA confirmed that the Natanz cascade remained inoperative (since November 2003), adding that on October 19 Iran had finally supplied copies of the contract and report concerning the P2 magnets after several Agency requests. These Iranian "gestures" coincided with a consistent European desire to avoid escalation, giving birth to the November 14 "Paris Agreement." This new arrangement sought to clarify which of Tehran's nuclear activities were "acceptable" or "prohibited" (in view of by-now familiar Iranian violations of previous understandings such as from October 2003).

Rohani's testimony (2005) provides a glimpse at behind-the-scenes contacts during this period between the EU3 and Iran. In his portrayal of events, Tehran did not feel threatened, sensed no urgency, and also was in no hurry to accept incentives offered by the EU3. According to Rohani, the EU3
emphasized that during the suspension period, as negotiations advanced, one of the important issues in the talks would be how to proceed with enrichment (in such a way as to provide guarantees that Iran is not trying to develop nuclear weapons).

In Rohani's version, the EU3 comes across as wavering on its own demands. For example, he points out that while its initial proposal insisted on "objective guarantees" that Iran's program would be suspended until the crisis was resolved, a later offer omits this reference as well as the term "indefinitely" concerning the suspension's length – the latter in response to Tehran's concern that this was ambiguous. In response to Iran's demand that negotiations on a long-term arrangement be completed within two months, the EU3 insisted on a period of two years – but at the same time, according to Rohani, "they also said that the two years that they are suggesting for these negotiations is not a precise timetable; 'you said two months, and we countered by saying two years, but we can talk about this and we think we can agree on a timetable."

Rohani's aide Mousavian (2012) characterizes the agreement as significant gain for Iranian diplomacy: "The Paris Agreement showed that achieving an agreement that would support Iran’s enrichment program was possible." In his view, the agreement “reaffirmed Europe’s commitment” to prevent Security Council action, and in the end “Tehran managed to channel the nuclear case in a direction much more in accordance with its national interests.”

From the above it emerges that the EU3 did not sufficiently insist on the realization of the demands it put forward by its own initiative.

**Motivation Levels**
There is general agreement in professional literature regarding the importance of the level of motivation on the part of the coercing side as a vital component in its ability to reach its objective. George (1991) states that the coercing side is obligated to project a level of motivation to impose behavior change which is higher than that of the adversary. The guiding principle is that a motivation level which is lower than that of the adversary will harm the chances for success of coercive measures. The following examines developments in this context.

The August 2002 exposure of Iran's illicit nuclear activities by an Iranian opposition group appears to have been a formative period for both sides with regard to determining goals, and stemming from this setting the motivation bar for attaining these goals. It is clear, however, that at the time Iran had the upper hand since it was caught in the midst of a nuclear program advancing on all fronts while the international community had to close gaps in this context.

This gap-closing began in earnest in February 2003, when Iran admitted for the first time – in response to IAEA inquiries that increased with frequency from August 2002 – the construction of two enrichment facilities at Natanz. Iran also confessed the same month that the Kalaye Electric workshop had served to manufacture centrifuge parts (claiming at the same time that centrifuges assembled from these parts were not used for any experimentation involving nuclear material – neither in the workshop nor any other location in Iran). Furthermore, Tehran admitted that in 1991 it imported natural uranium in order to experiment in the conversion process, making use of it at various sites – another fact it had failed to report to the IAEA.

Despite these admissions, Iran denied the IAEA access to Kalaye Electric. It behaved similarly in March, when it refused to allow the Agency to take
samples at the site. These facts indicate that Iran's motivation to continue advancing its nuclear program remained high despite the exposure, even if it did recognize the need to minimize damage caused.

Three main developments were behind these admissions:

* President Khatami's February 9 statement that Iran was involved in uranium mining for use in nuclear power plants. He declared that Iran would pursue all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including reprocessing, even though its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes (Hafezi, 2003);

* A February 20 claim by the Iranian opposition that Tehran had experimented with centrifuge systems at Kalaye Electric, which was listed as a watch factory. Furthermore, the installation of centrifuges at a site near Isfahan and the construction of the Arak site from 1996 were also revealed (Kessler, 2003);

* The February 21-22 visit to Iran by IAEA Director General ElBaradei, during which he discovered the existence of a pilot site at Natanz with 160 assembled centrifuges and parts for an additional 1,000 centrifuges (Kessler, 2003).

It appears the state of shock that engulfed the international community since the August 2002 revelations continued well into March 2003, both because of the enormity of findings related to nearly two decades of Iranian concealment efforts and against the backdrop of the global outcry surrounding coalition forces’ incursion into Iraq that same month. The March 18 BoG statement by Greece (EU Statement on Iran, 2003a) on behalf of the EU is clear evidence of this, as it settles for mere mention of
the scope of Iran’s nuclear program and expression of concern that the IAEA was not updated. This statement provides no indication of increased motivation to roll back Tehran’s nuclear program.

This trend continued the months following: while the international community was organizing, Iran engaged in damage control - usually by conveying information on past activities, including partial information and even lies, more often than not in response to the uncovering of incriminating findings – while at the same time advancing the program in practical terms. In May, for instance, Iran updated the Agency regarding the construction of the Arak heavy water facility – which, as already mentioned, was exposed by an opposition group in August 2002. In June, it fed UF6 into the first centrifuge at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. In July, Tehran conveyed to the Agency the plans for the Arak reactor while excluding any reference to hot cells, despite their centrality to such a reactor.

As previously mentioned in the chapter on Demands and Realization, during the summer months European motivation to confront Iran began to rise, against the backdrop of Iran’s continued evasiveness – and perhaps what then seemed like the end of the crisis in Iraq. This development found its expression, inter alia, in the EU foreign ministers’ threat concerning the future of negotiations for a trade and cooperation agreement (GAERC, 2003b).

Despite sharpened wording, the coercing side’s increasing motivation was not translated into deeds. As a result, Iran’s own motivation level rose steadily as it continued its successful maneuvering vis-à-vis the international community. By August it no longer feared correcting earlier false reports or making admissions after the fact. For example, that same month Iran announced that its P1 centrifuge R&D program had operated at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) from 1988-1995, then moving to Kalaye
Electric where it remained operational from 1995-2003 before being transferred to Natanz in 2003. This was in fact a rectification of its June statement, according to which the activity in question began only in 1997. On August 19 – after the Agency discovered UF4\textsuperscript{24} samples from the TNRC, Iran admitted in a letter (from the same date) that it conducted conversion experiments during the 1990s.

By October Iran could have deduced that the coercing side was not sufficiently motivated to stop its nuclear program. Perhaps this is why it then decided to put an end to its efforts to conceal activities at Kalaye Electric – efforts which included dismantling and moving equipment to another location, as well as overhaul of the site in order to prevent the use of nuclear material from being discerned. Tehran also admitted that in contrast with its previous declarations, almost all the material important to the conversion process was produced at the TNRC and the Nuclear Technology/Research Center in Isfahan from 1981-1993 – without reporting any of this to the IAEA.

It should also be noted that before the international community took even one concrete step to punish Iran, Tehran had already advanced toward completing a 164-centrifuge “cascade” at Natanz.

Nevertheless, the September BoG resolution hinting to the possibility of transferring the nuclear file to the Security Council served warning to the Iranians that the coercing side's motivation had risen – as indicated by Rohani himself (2005). According to his account, Iran concluded as a result of the resolution that even if it did cooperate fully with the IAEA with regard to all the issues mentioned in the decision its file would still be moved to the Security Council in November. Tehran therefore had to find a solution and cooperate with the Agency to prevent such an eventuality. Rohani emphasizes that the goal was not necessarily to guarantee Iran would never
be referred to the Security Council, but rather to prevent this at a time when the US was at the height of its strength and Tehran was unprepared.

In Rohani's view (2005), Iran faced the following dilemma: If it presented a complete picture of its past nuclear activities, this itself could bring about the Security Council scenario. Meanwhile, behaving otherwise would be considered a violation of the BoG resolution – leading to the Security Council anyway. This dilemma gave birth to the idea of reaching an agreement with the EU3, which sent Tehran the previously-mentioned letter in the summer of 2003 with a proposal to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue. According to Rohani, the letter suggested Tehran abandon its program to complete the nuclear fuel cycle (a proposal which also appeared in the Russian letter).

Expressions of increased motivation by the coercing side generated the decision to invite the EU3 foreign ministers to Tehran. According to Rohani (2005), the goal was to present a “full picture” of Iran's past nuclear activities without landing in the Security Council. For perhaps the first time since the start of the crisis Tehran felt a sense of urgency, and not only because of the BoG threat regarding the Security Council. Iran realized it was facing a united front on the coercing side: beyond the similar letters from the EU3 and Russia, most of the activities it failed to report to the IAEA were reported on by other countries it had worked with (such as China and Russia). Tehran also learned, according to Rohani, that the Agency already knew about clandestine experiments it had conducted in the past.

Against this backdrop, on October 16 Rohani informed the IAEA director general that Iran had decided to fully reveal all its nuclear activities – past and present. From October 27 (to November 1) Tehran conveyed additional information regarding its plutonium activities; On October 28 it informed the Agency about equipment and material related to the laser program; during
November it closed the Natanz 'cascade' and removed all the infrastructure at the Levizan facility, near Tehran; and on November 8 it permitted the IAEA to take separated plutonium samples.

The last gesture, particularly, did not necessarily contribute to transparency, but rather added further question marks regarding Iran's sincerity in presenting a complete picture: in those same samples the Agency found contradictions between its findings and Iran's declarations. Worrying signs grew during a December inspectors' visit, when the IAEA discovered laser enrichment equipment which Iran failed to report in its October 21 letter. Tehran had no choice but to admit the omission.

In January 2004 Iran once again demonstrated its strategy of conveying partial reports when it was forced to admit, for the first time, that in 1994 it received from foreign sources the plans to construct P2 centrifuges. On January 5 Tehran provided additional information concerning laser equipment. On March 5 it stated in writing that its P2 centrifuge R&D activities were not included in its October 21 declaration because it intended to do so in accordance with the timetable determined by the IAEA with regard to implementation of the Additional Protocol.

On March 15 Iran informed the Agency it would be ready to begin verification of the suspension of centrifuge parts manufacture on April 10 – about a month later and more than five months since the signing of the Tehran Agreement. However, in a characteristic Iranian move – all the more so after removal of the Security Council threat – it added that due to a disagreement three companies would continue manufacturing the parts. This was yet another expression of its determination to continue advancing its nuclear program, with buoyed self-confidence and a higher motivation level than its opponent. And as previously mentioned, in its June 23 letter to the
IAEA director general Iran announced that it intended to cancel its suspension commitment.

Both Rohani (2005) and Mousavian (2012) make clear that Iran's motivation to advance the nuclear program remained high throughout the crisis, including at its height. After successfully removing the Security Council threat, Tehran focused on making concrete progress – which could explain its conduct during the months before they canceled the suspension. The Europeans wanted the suspension but their motivation was much lower than that of the Iranians – making it easier for the latter to decide on the cancellation.

According to Rohani (2005), the Iranians hoped for the removal of their file from the IAEA agenda. When this did not happen, they canceled the suspension and resumed manufacture and assembly of centrifuges. While Rohani admits that Tehran’s action created a tense atmosphere against Iran, he does not sound particularly concerned by this.

Rohani believed the Europeans gradually reached the conclusion that Iran did not agree to suspend those areas in which it still faced technical problems, meaning it wanted to advance its program under the cover of the suspension and relative calm in the international climate as a result. As if to confirm Europe’s suspicion, he emphasizes: “We completed the Isfahan project during the suspension. While we were talking with the Europeans we installed equipment in areas of the Isfahan facility, even though its completion was still a ways off.”

And yet, it appears from the above that against its better judgment the EU3 was not able to sustain the necessary motivation level to confront the Iranians. The cost of this inability is summarized well, in retrospect, by Kam (2007):
Since Iran has demonstrated a determination to adhere to its drive toward nuclear weapons in the face of the hesitancy shown by states that seek to stop it – including by leveling significant sanctions against it – the possibility that Iran will eventually obtain a nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out if these characteristics do not change.

**Compliance vs. non-compliance: Cost and Benefit**

Another essential element – perhaps the most vital – mentioned by theoretical literature concerning successful implementation of diplomatic power is defined by Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06) as the necessity in which the cost of non-compliance must outweigh its benefit from the adversary’s perspective. This component possesses a clear security basis, and constitutes a kind of bridge between “diplomatic power” and “nuclear reversal.” To illustrate the point, one can recall the above authors’ contention regarding the close affinity between the adversary’s internal considerations – especially political, and not necessarily economic – and the chances for success of those implementing diplomatic power. In their view, the adversary will naturally ask: Does compliance (or non-compliance) serve the security of my regime?

Levite (2002/03) insists that the adversary must discern an improvement in its external security situation as a necessary condition for a reversal decision. Campbell et al (2004) support this in their determination that states drive toward nuclear weapons inter alia as part of their search for increased security. These assertions will serve as the backdrop for this examination of what transpired in the nuclear crisis with Iran.

Even before the entry of coalition forces into Iraq in March 2003, it was apparently common wisdom among relevant European decision makers that
the EU’s normative approach – and not the threat of force – would guide conduct vis-à-vis Iran in the nuclear crisis. Preliminary indications of this already appeared only a few months after the Iranian opposition’s revelations, when on November 5, 2002 British Foreign Minister Straw responded in a BBC radio interview to comments made by then-Israeli Prime Minister Sharon in favor of attacking Iran in retaliation for its WMD and ballistic missile programs:

I profoundly disagree with him. I think the way to ensure proper progress with Iran is not by that kind of hostile threat, but by the process of constructive and critical engagement that we are involved in. (Left, 2002)

On the same day, Foreign Minister Straw appeared before the House of Commons and added to the previous comments as follows:

There is a significant difference between Iran and Iraq. Iraq is a totalitarian dictatorship, whereas Iran is an emerging democracy. I take the same view in respect of the holding of Iran's weapons of mass destruction as we have taken in respect of the more serious problem of North Korea. So far as is humanly possible, we should pursue a diplomatic route if that remains remotely feasible. (Straw, 2002)

Straw's position left no room for interpretation (nor did earlier-mentioned comments by Patten in February 2003, supporting the possibility of Iranian regional leadership) and could have conveyed to Tehran a sense that the threat of force would diminish over time. This was certainly Straw's
intention, being committed to the EU’s basic policy of a "critical dialogue" with Iran (he may also have wanted to distance the UK from the US, at least on the Iranian issue). However, developments on the ground – a US military presence in Afghanistan since late 2001 and the approaching American attack against Iraq – were liable to convey to Tehran the opposite message, one of a worsening security environment. Rohani (2005) himself confirms this, pointing out that parallel to calls to sharpen handling of the Iranian file in the BoG – following the IAEA director general's visit to Iran at the end of February 2003 – the US was engulfed by a debate as to whether to first attack Iraq or Iran. It was his sense that after Iraq, there were those in the international community who believed conditions were ripe to raise the Iranian issue in the BoG in order to pave the way for its transfer to the UN Security Council. Tehran believed the idea was to plan sanctions and even military action against it, or at least to level political and economic pressure against the country. In the situation that existed at the outset of the international community's handling of the crisis, the Iranians would have seen mostly contradictions in assessing the cost/benefit balance of complying with world demands. On the one hand, the Europeans made clear both that Iran would not be physically harmed and that it would be able to enjoy political and economic benefits by cooperating with the demands. On the other hand, the clouds of war gathered along its borders, a reality which strengthened its commitment to advancing its nuclear program. The lack of a genuine threat on the part of the international community, particularly the EU3, became an increasingly entrenched situation at this point of the crisis – as illustrated by comments by Tony Blair, then UK prime minister, at a June 4 parliamentary debate (Blair, 2003). Emphasizing
"it is important that Iran realizes the seriousness of the international community's intent on this issue," Blair added:

No one is threatening military action in respect of Iran, but it must understand that the whole of the world community – there was complete unanimity on this at the G8 – does not find it acceptable that this nuclear weapons program continues to be developed in Iran. Both on that issue and in relation to the issue of terrorism and its support for terrorists, it has to understand that we are very serious about the unacceptability of these activities. We have worked very long and hard to have a proper dialogue with the Iranian Government. I welcome that and I think that it is good to do so, but it has to happen on the basis of being absolutely upfront with them about the concerns that we and the whole international community have.

While the "threat" implied in the above seems to be no more than the cessation of dialogue, the Iranians saw matters differently – particularly in view of the results of the June BoG meeting (which concluded with the chairperson's statement): from their perspective, the international community's soft conduct was merely the first step toward tougher measures down the road. Indeed, Tehran envisioned the implementation of a combination of measures ranging from diplomatic power to the use of force. According to Rohani (2005) and Mousavian (2012), at this juncture the Iranians felt a genuine threat to the state: the Iranian national security council began discussing the issue for the first time in order to consolidate Tehran's modus operandi, fearing they might be facing a "scheme" against them. Numerous meetings were convened during this period with a view to the following BoG session in September; these were accompanied by a
public debate concerning adoption of the Additional Protocol – the EU3’s primary demand.

It appears that at this point a thorough and sustained implementation of a combination of tools, including a threat of force, could have brought about a change in Iranian behavior. In mid-2003, Tehran was engulfed by a sense of danger, and therefore from its point of view the cost of non-compliance was significantly higher than its benefits. But the coercing side missed its opportunity, as Rohani (2005) emphasizes in reference to the October 2003 Tehran Agreement.

In his view, by then Iran was operating under "optimal conditions": according to his analysis, the US was still at the height of its power ("pride," in his words), but the Europeans did not want the Iranian file to reach the Security Council lest this create another regional crisis (following Iraq). As a result, Iran presented the IAEA with what Tehran called a "full picture" (albeit far from that, as already mentioned) and also announced that it would sign the Additional Protocol.

The Tehran Agreement tipped the balance in favor of non-compliance, since in effect it weakened (though did not completely remove) the Iranians’ sense that their physical existence was at risk. This was reflected, inter alia, by the publication of an unusual article by the conservative daily Jamhouri Eslami (associated with the supreme leader) on November 23, on the eve of the BoG session. The article includes an explicit call for developing nuclear weapons, and determines that while the Iranian regime's policy rejects the acquisition of nuclear weapons the Iranian people demand otherwise. The article emphasizes that it is not referring to the use of nuclear weapons, but rather to caution the US not to use them "and not to dictate its policies to others" – especially Iran, which it is threatening (in Jamhouri's opinion).
Rohani (2005) confirms this viewpoint. Satisfied with Europe keeping its promise to prevent transfer of the case to the Security Council as a result of the November BoG meeting, he identifies a developing challenge with a Europe that had begun to doubt Tehran's intentions and ask whether Iran had already received the plans for a nuclear bomb. The question stemmed from information provided by Libya to the US and the UK concerning the activities of the Khan network, a development of which Iran was not aware at the time. Despite the crisis of confidence developing with the EU3 due to the Libya case, Rohani believed Iran continued to reap benefits from non-compliance.

This is how Rohani (2005) summarized in retrospect (probably in autumn 2004) the cost/benefit balance of non-compliance with international demands between 2003-2004:

As far as technology is concerned, we are in better shape than we were last year. Last year, we were at the beginning of this project. For instance, we did not even have the primary material needed to enrich uranium, if we intended to do so. We had purchased a small quantity of primary material (UF6) from abroad, which would have been enough for a few months. But today the Isfahan facility has become operational, and we have made good progress in this area from a technical point of view. We are also in a good situation as far as building parts and assembly is concerned. That is to say, we have produced many parts during the last year. Of course, these activities are no longer secret and take place under IAEA supervision. The IAEA knows how many parts we have produced, what we have assembled, and how many centrifuges we have readied.

With regard to the number of centrifuges, our situation is relatively good. When we wanted to negotiate with the Europeans last year, we had something like 150 centrifuges, but today we have about 500 centrifuges that are ready and operational. We could increase that number to 1,000. We
would not have any problems, should we decide to do so. We have made good progress in this area.

Technological progress was not the only element considered a non-compliance benefit by Tehran: The Iranians also felt they had succeeded in driving a wedge between Europe and the United States, which they continued to fear well into 2004 despite developments in Iraq during this period. According to Rohani (2005), while the Europeans were less concerned by the prospect of Security Council action in 2004 than the previous year (when they feared a new crisis and regional war), they still did not want a move toward the Security Council – where in his view the US had the upper hand.

In Rohani’s opinion, the Europeans feared that over time the US would be able to topple the Iranian regime – Europe, he surmised, had no interest in a pro-American government in Tehran, even though it continued to oppose Iran's completion of the nuclear fuel cycle. He did not believe that Europe was Tehran's friend, per se, but that it did value Iran's strategic value as "breathing room."

Rohani (2005) could base his determination, inter alia, on comments made by then foreign minister of the UK Jack Straw during a parliamentary debate on November 9, 2004 (Straw, 2004) – just days before the signing of the Paris Agreement. In his comments, Straw assured the parliament he knew of "no suggestions emanating from the United States of any idea of military action," adding he could envisage "no circumstances in which military action would be justified” and assuring that it formed "no part of the policy of Her Majesty's Government."

According to Rohani (2005), the Iranians accrued additional benefits from their non-compliance: both in consolidating the national, domestic arena as
well as accumulating experience in dealing with leading diplomatic players in the international community. He emphasizes that while at the start of the crisis Iran was not prepared for the possible transfer of its nuclear portfolio to the Security Council, down the road it succeeded in attaining cooperation among the political, security and economic spheres in the country; prepared the necessary national contingency plans for this scenario; and improved its diplomatic status in the international arena.

The issue of economic incentives is relevant here: as previously mentioned, these rank lower as far as their ability to assist diplomatic power's chances of success – including to achieve nuclear rollback. Despite this, in the EU3's worldview such incentives played a central role as part of Europe's normative approach favoring economic incentives ("positive conditioning") – inter alia as part of a belief that these symbolize European power at its height. However, in this case the adversary was apparently not particularly impressed by this symbol of power.

Compared with the strongly positive depiction of Iranian achievements by the diplomacy-oriented Mousavian (2012), from his strategic perch Rohani (2005) is much more practical and even dismissive of the incentives package that would later form the Paris Agreement. He emphasizes that while the EU3 expressed support for Iran's membership in the WTO, in fact unlike the US they never opposed this. Furthermore, in his view there was no short-term benefit to be gained from an immediate resumption of trade agreement negotiations between Europe and Iran.

Judging by the November 22 statement issued by the EU foreign ministers (GAERC, 2004b) following the Paris Agreement signing, the Europeans felt they were entering a new era in their long-term relations with Iran – albeit while demonstrating caution, in view of past experience. On the one hand, the declaration emphasizes the centrality of the continued suspension – as
defined by the agreement – to the furthering of the entire process, as well as
the importance of negotiations for a long-term arrangement involving
objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear program is solely for peaceful
purposes. On the other hand, it reiterates the EU's willingness to explore
ways to develop economic and political cooperation with Tehran – after the
latter acts to deal with the EU's areas of concern – and makes reference to
the November 5 European Council determination that trade agreement and
cooperation negotiations would resume after confirmation of the suspension.
Despite Europe's intentions, Rohani (2005) leaves no doubt that from Iran's
perspective the benefit of this process lay elsewhere:

As for the question of what we can do now that they all disagree with our
having the fuel cycle, I submit to you that we require an opportunity, time
to be able to act on our capability in this area. That is, if one day we are
able to complete the fuel cycle and the world sees that it has no choice, that
we do possess the technology, then the situation will be different. The
world did not want Pakistan to have an atomic bomb or Brazil to have the
fuel cycle, but Pakistan built its bomb and Brazil has its fuel cycle, and the
world started to work with them.

Creating a sufficiently high cost to exact compliance and prevent nuclear
proliferation is not an easy task – as demonstrated by the Pakistani case
referenced by Rohani. That the EU3 had difficulty tackling this challenge in
the Iranian case is therefore not surprising. As Kam (2007) emphasizes:

Iran's ability to successfully develop nuclear weapons depends on two
contradictory factors: its own determination to produce such a weapon
despite the price it will pay, as opposed to the determination of the west and
other countries to stop its drive for these weapons – despite the cost involved.

**Foregoing the threat of force**

In theoretical literature dealing with political power, there is no consensus regarding the value of the threat of force as part of the formula for attaining the goals of coercion. Authors influenced principally by the events of World War II and the subsequent Cold War are inclined to attach greater importance to this component. Others who focus more on post-Cold War events tend to downplay it. Nevertheless, the vast majority agree that it must be taken into account.

As previously mentioned in the chapter on *Compliance vs. non-compliance: Cost and Benefit*, the parties to the Iranian nuclear crisis were crystal clear with regard to the use of force: the Europeans strongly opposed formal inclusion of the military element in their policy calculations vis-à-vis Tehran, while the Iranians themselves greatly feared the use of force – American force, in particular. Thus the US constituted a kind of missing link in the chain of the crisis: on the one hand, Washington possessed the required military capability in general and in the Iranian context specifically; on the other hand, it possessed a military capability none of the other relevant parties desired. In view of this gap, it makes sense to review the American perspective of the subject – first and foremost in order to better understand the European decision to eschew this tool.

John Bolton, who served as the State Department’s undersecretary for arms control and international security, formulated relevant American policy during the period under examination. As he himself indicates (Bolton, 2007), Bolton rejected what he considered the main rationale for the EU3’s
initiative: to prove that they could stop WMD proliferation better than the US – meaning without the use of force (especially against the backdrop of the Iraqi operation).

While the EU3 focused on solving the crisis solely with diplomatic tools, Bolton maintained a different approach. His view of the European effort was unequivocal: if diplomacy with regimes such as Iran did not work “we needed to try something else, including military force if need be.”

In words, as in deeds, Bolton – like his European counterparts – projected a disinterest in pursuing a policy that integrates coercive diplomacy and a military threat. Bolton viewed the October 2003 EU3 foreign ministers’ visit to Tehran as a negative turn in Europe’s attempt to implement diplomatic power against Iran, and promoted a policy according to which the US would not be partner to this effort. In fact, he actively sought to enlist senior Administration officials in order to put a stop to the European initiative. Bolton was consistent in his approach throughout the crisis. An address he delivered on August 17, 2004 illustrated his mindset in this context (Bolton, 2004):

> Iran’s actions and statements do not bode well for the success of a negotiated approach to dealing with this issue. In June, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi renounced a central part of the deal Iran made last year with Britain, France and Germany to suspend its uranium enrichment programs, saying, ‘Iran feels itself no longer obliged to its commitments with the European Union trio and will revise its policies on nuclear activities and announce the new decisions within the coming days.’ And Iranian President Mohamed Khatami declared that Iran was no longer bound by any ‘moral commitment’ to continue suspending uranium enrichment. Iran’s decision on July 29 to resume the construction and
assembly of nuclear centrifuge parts domestically and remove the seals on material sealed by the IAEA is further cause for alarm.

Iran’s repudiation of a central element of its deal with the EU-3 is a substantial setback for the European approach, and underlines why we continue to believe that the Iranian nuclear weapons program must be taken up by the UN Security Council, falling as it does within the Council’s mandate to address threats to international peace and security.

He further emphasized (ibid) that the Administration was concerned by the broader danger of proliferation and not just the Iranian threat:

Clearly, the time to report this issue to the Security Council is long overdue. To fail to do so would risk sending a signal to would-be proliferators that there are not serious consequences for pursuing secret nuclear weapons programs. As Condoleezza Rice26 told Fox News two weeks ago: ‘The Iranians have been trouble for a very long time. And it’s one reason that this regime has to be isolated in its bad behavior, not quote-unquote, engaged’.

It appears that Bolton’s decision to prevent genuine US involvement in the EU3 initiative effectively shut the door to any possibility that Washington could meaningfully influence the process. This conclusion stems not only from an examination of the chain of events and his own comments, but also from private conversations this author conducted with individuals from the EU3 and the US Administration who served in senior positions relevant to the period in question. Ironically, while the EU3 rejected American military prowess, it very much wanted Washington’s “security assurances,” i.e. a non-belligerency guarantee provided by the US to Iran. This guarantee was supposed to join
an array of carrots to be offered down the road, such as supporting Tehran’s WTO membership bid and allowing the sale of spare parts for civilian aircraft.

The potential benefit of integrating US military prowess was firmly rooted in reality. As Rohani (2005) himself admitted, throughout 2003 the Iranians greatly feared the possibility of an American military strike – and this danger guided their own conduct vis-à-vis the international community. In retrospect, this fear led to two steps undertaken by the Iranians – moves which could have provided the opportunity to attain the EU3’s goal of delaying, or even freezing, Tehran’s nuclear program.

The first action was dispatching a letter to the US in May 2003 (Kessler, 2007) via the Swiss ambassador to Tehran (Switzerland formally represents Washington’s interests in Iran). In a letter he faxed to the administration on May 4 the ambassador confirmed that an Iranian proposal for comprehensive discussions was personally approved by the supreme leader, president and foreign minister (Parsi, 2007; Slavin, 2007; Mousavian, 2012).

According to Flynt Leverett (Porter, 2007; BBC News, 2007), who served on the US National Security Council as Middle East director at the time, Iran's negotiations proposal included recognition of the need for Iran to address Washington’s concerns regarding the nuclear program; however, it did not include any concrete concession with a view to the suggested negotiations. Furthermore, according to Lawrence Wilkerson (ibid), then chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, the proposal was rejected as a result of opposition led by Vice President Dick Cheney which could not be overcome by Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage – who leaned toward a positive response. As Wilkerson recalls the incident, Tehran’s proposal asked that Washington cease its hostility toward the regime, cancel sanctions
against it, dismantle the violent opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq and hand over its members to Iran.

The second, more significant move was revealed in the US National Intelligence Council Estimate in 2007. The report determines: “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.” But it also states: “We also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” (A footnote to this passage adds: “For the purposes of this Estimate, by ‘nuclear weapons program’ we mean Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran's declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.”)

These two steps by Iran conveyed a clear message of anxiety and even fear of a military strike, and thus coincide with Rohani’s (2005) depiction of events. As mentioned, he emphasized that Tehran sensed a genuine threat during the period between the IAEA director-general’s visit there at the end of February 2003 and the BoG session in June that same year. Rohani expressed a similar apprehension when addressing the BoG resolution of September – adopted during the period Iran allegedly halted its weaponization program, according to the NIC report - a time in which Iran still identified transfer of its case to the Security Council with a possible military strike.

It should be recalled that the “Axis of Evil” speech delivered by President W. Bush on January 29, 2002 (Bush, 2002) also hovered over US-Iran relations at the time. While the comments were made six months before exposure of Tehran’s nuclear clandestine nuclear activities by the Iranian opposition group, it is reasonable to assume that they still reverberated in the Iranian capital. Also noteworthy is the very fact that Bush grouped Iran
together with Iraq – soon to be attacked -- and North Korea as pursuers of WMD, emphasizing:

    I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.

The 2007 reports concerning the two above-mentioned Iranian moves in 2003 have since aroused a sustained public debate in the English-language international media. Many voices in this debate take the view that the administration missed a supposed opportunity to forge a rapprochment with Tehran. While the issue is beyond the parameters of this study, it is certainly germane to review how the integration of an American military threat into the EU3’s modus operandi could have contributed to stopping the Iranian nuclear program over time – including its overt civilian aspects. While the question is hypothetical in nature, examination of comments by senior administration officials and media reports (particularly from 2003) could shed light on the realm of the possible.

Common wisdom has it that in mid-2002 exposure of the dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program did not divert the administration’s attention from Iraq. For example, a December 19 report (Kessler, 2002) claimed that while administration officials expressed “serious concerns” regarding the Iranian nuclear sites, the US had adopted a low profile and was focused on diplomatic pressure. To back this up, the report quoted Powell as saying:

    We have had conversations with Russia that we are concerned about this and that some of the support they are providing might well go to developing
nuclear weapons within Iran, and it will continue to be a matter of
discussion with us and the Russians.

(ibid)

Months later Powell reiterated the tone of concern without any call for
concrete international action, not to mention the use of force. For example,
in a March 10 report (Warrick and Kessler, 2003) Powell is quoted as stating
that “suddenly” it appears Iran is much more advanced in its nuclear
aspirations.

Naturally, a review of one administration official’s comments does not
exhaust such a probe examination of the approach of other officials is
absolutely necessary for a more complete picture of the prevalent situation at
the time.

Indeed, Condoleezza Rice, then national security advisor, adopted a much
more forceful tone than Powell in a June address (Rice, 2003). Hinting
especially at Russia and the European Union, she said:

It’s important for countries that have relations with Iran and have trade with
Iran and research relations with Iran on nuclear matters to take a hard look
at doing that with a country that has not yet satisfied the world that it is not
seeking a nuclear weapon.

Rice also expressed a certain frustration with the difficulty in stopping
countries such as Iran:

We have a non-proliferation problem in international politics. We have a
serious non-proliferation problem. We have many states that are seeking to
get nuclear technologies leading to nuclear weapons, we have a set of non-proliferation regimes which are constraining honest states and not constraining dishonest states – we’ve got to face up to that.

Perhaps against the backdrop of the action in Iraq, Rice also addressed what she viewed as limitations in US capabilities:

Now the United States cannot face up to this alone. We can try, but we won’t be very effective. This is something that the international community has to do, and we’ve got to ask ourselves how we do it.

(ibid)

There was nothing in the above comments by Powell and Rice that the Iranians could interpret as a threat of force against them.

Not so comments made by Armitage during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on October 28 – the period in which, according to the NIC report (2007), Tehran froze its nuclear weaponization program – when he made opaque reference to regime change as a matter of policy in the Iranian case:

We seek to counter the government of Iran's negative and destructive policies and actions, while encouraging constructive policies and actions and engaging in a direct dialogue with the Iranian people about the freedoms they want for their own country.

(Armitage, 2003)

Nevertheless, Armitage also included a more calming message:
As President Bush noted when talking about Iran last week, not every policy issue needs to be dealt with by force. Secretary Powell also noted last week that we do not seek conflict with Iran. We will continue to pursue non-proliferation and other such control measures as necessary and we must keep all available options on the table, given the lack of clarity about Iran's future direction and ultimate destination. At the same time, we are prepared to engage in limited discussions with the government of Iran about areas of mutual interest, as appropriate.

As if to reinforce Rice’s comments, Armitage projected a bit more confidence regarding Washington’s capabilities vis-à-vis Tehran, while also emphasizing the importance of coordinated international actions. After enumerating various areas in which the US was actively opposing Iranian activities – “sanctions, interdiction, law enforcement, diplomacy and international public opinion” – he added:

When necessary, we will act alone. (…) We believe, however, that international and multilateral responses – if sustained – will be especially effective in meeting the challenges Iran poses to regional stability, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, and the rights of its own citizens. As President Bush said last week, we have confidence in the power of patience and the collective voice of the international community to resolve disputes peacefully. (…) We believe a united international front is especially critical in dealing with Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons program, about which there is widespread concern across the international community.

His comments were made shortly after the signing of the Tehran Agreement between the EU3 and Iran, and Armitage took advantage of the opportunity to reference the Europeans:
We consistently have urged our friends and allies to condition any improvements in their bilateral or trade relations with Iran on concrete, sustained, and verifiable changes in Iran’s policies in this and other areas of concern. We think it is appropriate, for instance, that the European Union has conditioned progress in its Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran on movement in these areas.

Armitage’s comments at the hearing – especially during the question-and-answer session – reflected Bolton’s approach (Bolton, 2007) to the effect that US policy was to stand off to the side and wait for Europe’s failure, at which time Washington could then act as it saw fit. At the same time, however, they highlighted a lack of clarity regarding the administration’s concrete intentions vis-à-vis Iran at the time (and taken together with certain aspects of comments by Rice and Powell, perhaps even reflected a certain integration of Europe’s multilateralism thinking into the approach of some US officials).

For example, when asked whether Security Council referral was Washington’s ultimate goal, he replied that this was one alternative “if progress is not satisfactory” – but added:

But whether you would take the non-compliance and move them toward the U.N. Security Council and possibly sanctions or put them on probation or give them an ankle bracelet, as they do to people under house arrest, those are things that we have to consider and consider with our colleagues in Europe and the non-aligned movement. I think it is the most important thing, having gotten solidarity thus far, we have to maintain it.31
Not being part of its mandate, this study refrains on the whole from examining internal disagreements within the administration that certainly existed during the period in question – particularly, but not exclusively, between Cheney/Bolton on the one hand and Powell/Armitage on the other.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to ignore the subject entirely. For instance, Armitage’s response above appears to run contrary to Bolton’s consistent view of the need for Security Council referral. Furthermore, according to a relevant May 8 media report (Weisman, 2003), the demise of Saddam Hussein at the hands of the US military in Iraq “complicated matters” with regard to Iran. The analysis claimed:

There is now sharp disagreement within the administration over whether the new situation gives the United States more leverage over Tehran or less. As a consequence, administration officials say that they are embroiled in yet another internal debate about how best to deal with Iran's nuclear threat.

According to the report:

This time, the hawkish faction centered at the Pentagon favors working through the United Nations, hoping that the pressure will get Iran to abandon its program. They say that Iran has an incentive to cooperate because of the American military presence next door. The moderates want the United States to engage in talks with Iran on all the issues of concern in Washington -- not just about nuclear matters but also about American fears of a revolutionary brand of Islamic fundamentalism in Iraq supported by Iranian-backed Shiites.
If the above is any indication, the question of the impact of the tool of force was definitely a part of the internal administration discussion – albeit without a clear consensus emerging – but so was the issue of engagement. Indeed, according to Rohani (Bar’el, 2012), President Bush himself told IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei in March 2004 that he was ready to personally conduct direct negotiations in Washington DC with an Iranian official “with authority to close deals” in order to resolve “all the problems between us.”

Of course, Bush's readiness for talks did not necessarily remove the threat of US force from the policy-making agenda. The fact remains, however, that American force was never used against Tehran, nor even threatened explicitly (even if occasionally implied).

The US faced a complex challenge regarding the implementation of diplomatic power: the EU3 did not want the use of force that Washington could bring to the table, while at the same time the latter refused to provide assurances that it would not strike Iran. Nevertheless, messages to the effect that “all options are on the table” were hollow in the absence of a genuine willingness to back them up with actions on the ground. Under the circumstances, the administration faced at least three options: follow Bolton’s preference (Bolton, 2007) to remain on the sidelines, a policy essentially adopted by his superiors; actively join the European initiative while almost certainly diluting Washington's own principle positions, something which Bolton opposed; or carry out a unilateral military strike.

Implementation of military tools to prevent Iran from attaining its goals, as defined by Pape (1996), did not have to be comprehensive. In the first
instance, it could have taken the form of explicit verbal threats repeated over time, followed by troop movements – even if symbolic – toward the Iranian border (from Iraq and/or Afghanistan and/or Gulf states) without firing a shot. Of course, the success of this or some other use of force could not be guaranteed. Firstly, because the combination of tools requires coordination between diplomatic and military steps with regard to timing and measure. Secondly, since the use of force could very well have exacerbated Iran’s fears – thus accelerating, rather than slowing, its nuclear program.

Levite (2002/03) and Campbell et al. (2004) make reference to this risk of unintentionally accelerating nuclear activities, in their comments regarding the affinity between the development of nuclear weapons and the adversary’s perception of its security environment. Kam (2007) reinforces the point:

Iran’s primary motivation for seeking to obtain a nuclear weapon has been and remains the achievement of a defensive deterrent, which in the past was meant for Iraq, and which today is meant for the United States. In addition, Iran’s strategic interests include achieving hegemony over the Persian Gulf and the Middle East as a whole, as well as bolstering the domestic status of the Iranian regime.

(Kam, 2007)

He makes it unambiguously clear that:

From the vantage point of Iran’s leadership, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a strategic priority of paramount importance. Iran needs nuclear weapons first and foremost as a means of deterrence against the United States and other potential enemies.
The picture that emerges, then, is one of a “dynamics of neutralization” - in which three basic elements comprising the implementation of diplomatic power in the Iranian nuclear crisis act as much to negate the others as to complement them.

To elaborate this point: Europe considered the use of force a component which would at least have neutralized the potential of diplomacy, or would have even pushed Tehran to accelerate its program, and therefore acted to slow transfer of the case to the Security Council. Meanwhile, the US viewed European engagement with Iran and hesitation on the Security Council issue as an attempt to negate its own efforts to block the Iranians through the intimated threat of force. Finally, Iran’s perspective – ironically, albeit not surprisingly – was practically a mirror image of Washington’s: it considered European diplomacy an element advancing its program - by neutralizing the American threat of force - and in this context viewed transfer of its case to the Security Council a move liable to curb its nuclear aspirations.
Chapter Conclusion

The above review of the Iranian nuclear crisis, 2003-2004, emphasizes the complexity – particularly in a multi-state context - of trying to apply coercive diplomacy theories to this real-life attempt at preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran.

It emerges that the EU3 wavered in too many facets of coercive diplomacy to actually succeed in reaching its goal. Europe demonstrated numerous inconsistencies in sticking to its demands, as well as in conveying to Tehran a sense that it possessed the necessary level of motivation to see the crisis through until the conclusion desired by the West. At times it even appeared the EU3 felt uncomfortable, to say the least, with its own efforts to exact a genuine price for Iranian non-compliance.

Europe faced an adversary determined both to defend its vital interests as well as to learn its opponent's modus operandi – and through accumulated experience defeat the international community at its own game. The EU3’s almost dogmatic refusal to include the threat of the use of force in its tool box – despite the nature of its adversary - reinforces the sense that Europe over-reached in its hope to not only stop Iran, but to also create a new model of coercive diplomacy that would replace those attempted in the past.

Finally, while the ideological clash between the US and the EU3 obstructed an already handicapped international effort, it should be noted that at no point was it clear the US was truly ready to use force against Tehran.
Conclusion

This study has focused on the intersecting of the most relevant components between theory and the situation on the ground in the Iranian nuclear crisis, 2003-2004: demands of the coercing side and their implementation, its level of motivation as opposed to that of the adversary, and the cost/benefit balance of non-compliance on the part of the targetted state.

The dynamic between the US and the EU3 served as the primary focus, with two additional players fulfilling an important role: Iran, of course; and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the official UN body which did not set policy at any stage but whose activities and documents were central in reflecting the international community’s approach toward Tehran during the period in question.

Since the study’s boundaries were restricted to 2003-2004, much less attention has been paid to the period afterward. It is also important to bear in mind that during the years researched Iran’s president was Mohammad Khatami – who the Europeans, at least, considered a harbinger of a different Iran emerging, one seeking lines of communication to the West (whether real or imagined, this is how they viewed Khatami’s “Dialogue among Civilizations” effort). Furthermore, it should be recalled that oil prices at the time were much lower than subsequently, a fact vital to assessing Tehran’s ability to maneuver vis-à-vis the West during the crisis.

Nevertheless, the benefit of a decade of hindsight may very well reinforce this study’s conclusions, especially in view of Iran’s continued success in advancing its nuclear program. For despite all the means directed against Tehran since then, it is still moving toward the point in which the
international community will have no significant immediate-impact
preventive tool or other means of leverage to employ except the use of force.

In this context, the “dynamics of neutralization” identified in this study – in
which the three components of European diplomacy, American threat of
force and Iranian push for WMD vye against each other – in the end
alleviated the pressure Tehran faced during 2003-2004. This conclusion
should motivate researchers to revisit the issue of the threat of force as
referenced by Morgenthau (1948) and Schelling (1966), since the various
theories examined in this study essentially leave the international arena
without an effective diplomatic response in confronting WMD proliferation.

As mentioned, these theories include: the pessimism of George (1991)
concerning the potential for success of coercive diplomacy; the critical view
of Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06) regarding the effectiveness of political
and even economic power; the EU’s 2003 WMD Strategy (EU External
Relations, 2003) placing global coordinated normative action at the top of
efforts to combat strategic threats; the US approach (US National Security
Council, 2002), focusing on independent national action; as well as
determinations by arms control experts such as Levite (200/03), Campbell et
al. (2004) and Carter (2004) regarding the challenge of externally
influencing a state’s desire to develop nuclear weapons.

The above bring us back to Morgenthau (1948), particularly his
determination that diplomacy cannot rely only on the threat of force - just as
it cannot depend solely on persuasion or compromise. On the other hand,
diplomacy cannot ignore any relevant means of action – including the threat
of force – as required by circumstances.
This study rejects any focus on the effectiveness - or lack thereof - of one or more particular means of action in implementing diplomatic power, and instead recommends focusing on the manner of implementation of the various components – including the timing and measure of their implementation.

Of course, it is difficult to arrive at a magic formula that can dictate in advance a precise modus operandi regarding timing and measure. However, the effort to successfully confront WMD proliferation cannot avoid the need to create a scale of tool implementation within each and every category - whether the tools are diplomatic, economic or military – and plan in advance a strategy of action as if a game of chess. Furthermore, it is essential to firmly adhere to the implementation of the various tools as required, to carry out threats made, to recognize in real time the inefficacy of this or that tool – and to move on to another tool before it is too late.

Adoption of these recommendations is deeply connected with the motivation component, and exposes the problematic conduct of the EU3 reviewed in this study: if the coercing side does not swiftly adapt its tools and behavior as per developments, the targeted state is liable to interpret this as reflecting a low motivation level – and act accordingly in promoting its goals.

Time will tell if the international arena is currently in a period of transition from a focus on primarily civilian tools (diplomatic, political and economic pressure) to granting a renewed legitimacy to the use of force - as a more legitimate tool in imposing accepted international norms of behavior, when the civilian tools are unsuccessful. What is already clear is that Europe’s refusal to even consider the use of force – together with the lack of interest
on the part of the US, the symbol of force, in truly cooperating with the EU3 effort – created cracks in the implementation of the combination of tools, which in turn harmed the initiative’s chances for success.

But even if the threat of force is currently undergoing rehabilitation, any consideration of its use in confronting WMD proliferation should take into consideration the findings of De Nevers (2007) regarding the circumstances in which force is actually used. The implied message of her study is unequivocal: a proliferating state possessing the ability to cause military (or semi-military) damage to the coercing side is likely to enjoy immunity – meaning, chances are its damage capabilities will deter the state contemplating force from actually using it. Such a reality will not necessarily advance international efforts to confront growing threats to global peace and security.
Notes

1. This booklet is an updated version of the author’s Hebrew-language MA thesis, approved by Professors Gabriel Ben-Dor (Haifa University) and Gerald Steinberg (Bar Ilan University) and submitted to the Haifa University political science department in 2008. It has been enhanced primarily with an expanded look at the Iranian view of events, facilitated by English-language publications released since 2008 (particularly Mousavian, 2012).

2. The European Union as a political entity was essentially insignificant in the context of the issue under examination during the relevant period.

3. This study makes use of various relevant categories: coercion, coercive diplomacy, coercive power, compellence, and coercive credibility.

4. As expressed in an article (quoted elsewhere in this study) by Joschka Fischer, in which he determines:
   
   Nor is the debate about the military option -- destruction of Iran's nuclear program through US airstrikes -- conducive to resolving the issue. Rather, it rings of a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is no guarantee that attempts to destroy Iran's nuclear potential and thus its capability for a nuclear breakout would succeed. Moreover, as a victim of foreign aggression, Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions would be fully legitimized. Finally, a military attack on Iran would mark the beginning of a regional, and possibly global, military and terrorist escalation -- a nightmare for all concerned.
   
   (Fischer, 2006)

5. “Nuclear reversal” is also known as “nuclear rollback”; other arms control concepts, such as “restraint” and "hedging", are irrelevant to this study in view of the widespread assumption – accepted to this day – that
Iran had not mastered uranium enrichment technologies during the period under examination.

6. The intention is apparently to an approach differing from that of the US.

7. Levite’s comments were written before Libya was caught “red-handed,” and its subsequent decision to dismantle its nuclear capabilities. In the Libyan case, it appears that American leverage did not constitute the critical element in Libya’s decision but rather the very fact of being caught and the clear threat of the price Tripoli would pay if it did not dismantle. In this particular case Washington acted in cooperation with the UK (some believe that London actually took the lead). In any case, the Libyan case warrants its own in-depth study.

8. It is important to note that Carter, Nye and Einhorn – quoted in this document – were senior officials in the Clinton administration. This fact certainly could have influenced their professional views on the subject.


10. Unless otherwise indicated, references in this chapter to developments between the IAEA and Iran are taken from the Agency’s director-general reports (see: Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004).

11. This chapter contains insights provided by European, American and Israeli figures intimately involved in the Iranian nuclear crisis at the time, including a presence in face-to-face negotiations with the Iranians (where applicable). These figures have asked to remain anonymous, and this study respects their wishes while expressing appreciation for their vital contribution to its findings.
12. This study assumes that the wording of the BoG chairperson’s declaration from June 19, 2003 was already known to those who drafted the resolution.

13. According to Kane (2006), it appears the address was made somewhere between October 15 and November 14, 2004.

14. The final product of raw uranium mining, and the first significant basic stage in uranium enrichment as part of the nuclear fuel cycle.

15. Iran signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003 (“93+2” is the formal name of the protocol). Its parliament – the Majlis – never ratified the document.

16. The IAEA’s use of seals to hermetically close containers with nuclear material allows Agency inspectors (theoretically, at least) to know if a state has tampered with them or not. This tool is especially important for implementation of the organization’s primary mandate: to make certain there is no diversion of nuclear material for military/unknown purposes.

17. According to Rohani (2005), after the ministers signed the agreement and forwarded it to the Iranians, the US pressured them and in the end they backtracked on their alleged guarantee.

18. The seeds of an additional act of Iranian concealment were planted at this BoG session: Iranian Foreign Ministry Director-General for International Political Affairs, Amir H. Zamaninia, stated: “Suffice it to say that beryllium is an indispensable item in a research geared into a military program. And beryllium was never part of Iran’s buying list” (IAEA, 2004). Contrary to the Iranian’s contention, however, the IAEA Director General’s report from September 2, 2005 (IAEA, 2005) confirms that Tehran did in fact attempt to acquire beryllium – but its attempts “were not successful.”
19. See note number 16.

20. The P2 (P = Pakistan, its source) is the second-generation model of uranium enrichment centrifuges. The magnets are a component vital to its operation.

21. In the case of Iran, the 164-centrifuge configuration constitutes the basic structure of its uranium enrichment activity.

22. On November 14 Iran conveyed to the IAEA director general a letter announcing that in accordance with its agreement of the same day with the EU representatives, it had decided to expand the “suspension” of its nuclear operations so as to include all activities related to enrichment and reprocessing. As per the agreement, the letter defines this expansion as including manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation.

23. At the same time, Iran admitted to the IAEA that it had also established a UF6 conversion facility at Isfahan.

24. A dry form, intermediate product in the nuclear fuel cycle between “yellow cake” and UF6 (the gas form fed into centrifuges for the purposes of enrichment).

25. Rohani claimed that leading up to the June BoG session the Europeans reaffirmed their commitment to carry out the move, but once again backtracked.


27. See chapter in this study, Compliance vs. non-compliance: Cost and Benefit.

28. These moves were not known to the EU3 states in real time, as far as the author of this study could discern - inter alia on the basis of
conversations with figures directly involved in handling of the crisis during this period.

29. A US State Department spokesman is quoted in the article as saying: "This document did not come through official channels but rather was a creative exercise on the part of the Swiss ambassador." Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state at the time, shared his impression with *Newsweek* (February 2007) that the Iranians "were trying to put too much on the table," an approach which in his opinion would not facilitate effective negotiations.

30. Versions of the proposal appear in various sources.

31. A year later, during an interview to “Al Jazeera” on November 19, 2004, Armitage emphasized that “the incentives of the Europeans only work against the backdrop of the United States being strong and firm on this issue. In the vernacular, it’s a kind of good cop/bad cop arrangement. If it works, we’ll all have been successful. If it fails, we’ll all fail” (Armitage, 2004).
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